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I. INTRODUCTION
Effect,"'

The term "CSI
in the context of criminal jury trials, is
commonly used to define the impact that viewing fictional criminal
investigation shows like Crime Scene Investigation2 ("CSl") has upon
jurors' real life decision-making processes. 3 The CSI Effect has been
used to explain unexpected jury verdicts; 4 however, this Article coins a
1. Scholars and practitioners disagree regarding the existence of the CS! Effect. See, e.g., J.
Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stem, Devil in a White Coat: The Temptation of ForensicEvidence in
the Age of CSI, 41 NEw ENG. L. REV. 503, 506 (2007) (stating that studies have not yet proven

how much the media influences juries, judges, and lawyers); Simon Cole & Rachel Dioso, Law
and the Lab: Do TV Shows Really Affect How Juries Vote? Let's Look at the Evidence, WALL ST.

J., May 13, 2005, at W13 (suggesting that it is not even clear what the CSI Effect really is).
Prosecutors claim it makes juries more likely to acquit because they have exceedingly high
expectations of proof, and defenders claim it makes juries convict because they believe any
forensic evidence presented is conclusive proof of guilt. Id.; see also Simon A. Cole & Rachel
Dioso-Villa, CSI and its Effects: Media, Juries, and the Burden of Proof,41 NEW ENG. L. REV.

435, 463 (2007) [hereinafter CSI and its Effects] (expressing the opinion that prosecutors who
complain about the CSI Effect are merely offering an excuse for failed prosecution of certain
cases, i.e., "sour grapes"); Kimberlianne Podlas, "The CSI Effect": Exposing the Media Myth, 16
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 429, 461 (2006) (suggesting that "frequent viewers
of CSI are no more influenced by CSI factors than are non-frequent viewers."); Donald E. Shelton
et al., A Study of Juror Expectations and Demands Concerning Scientific Evidence: Does the

"CSI Effect" Exist?, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 331, 362 (2006) (positing the opinion that "[t]he
use of the term 'CS1 effect' is too crude .... [Ijincreased expectations of and demands for

scientific evidence is more likely the result of much broader cultural influences related to modem
technological advances ... a 'tech effect"'). Often the first issue in the debate centers around the
existence, or lack of existence, of the CSI Effect itself. See Tom R. Tyler, Viewing CSI and the
Threshold of Guilt: Managing Truth and Justice in Reality and Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. 1050, 1055

(2006).
2. CSI is currently one of the most popular fictional crime investigation television shows aired
on network television. See Nielsen Television - TV Ratings for Primetime: Season to Date,
http://tvlisitngs.zap2it.comratings/season.html (last visited July 26, 2009) [hereinafter Nielsen
Ratings] (listing CSI as the sixth most watched show on television during the 2008-2009 season).
Out of the top twenty network primetime shows during the 2008-2009 season, six shows depicted
criminal investigations. Id. Two versions of the CSI franchise, CS!: Miami and CSI: New York,
are rated at thirteen and nineteen respectively. Id.The show CSI revolves around a team of
forensic investigators. The show typically begins when they are called to a murder scene to
collect and analyze the evidence left by the killer. Their leader, Gil Grissom, has an ironclad
dedication to the idea that evidence is the only neutral truth teller. His team adheres to his belief
of the nature of evidence, and they use it to solve the crime as the plot culminates to a conclusion
of the episode, a conclusion that leaves the viewer with an absolute certainty of who the
wrongdoer is and precisely how the crime occurred.
3. United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 355 n.39 (5th Cir. 2007).
4. The two basic problems and fears are that: (1) jurors' expectations are unrealistically high
based on the fictional versions of criminal investigations and prosecutions that are regularly
viewed on television; and (2) jurors are improperly pre-conditioned to believe all forensic science
experts because most television shows depict the scientific evidence as infallible and conclusive
proof of guilt. See CSI and Its Effects, supra note 1,at 439. Either of these biases, if present in
the juror, can induce incorrect verdicts in the form of false acquittals or wrongful convictions.
See N.J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, The CSI Effect: Popular Fiction About Forensic Science
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new term, the "CSI Infection," in order to more appropriately describe
the thorough impact that the criminal investigation television pop
culture phenomenon 5 has made upon the criminal justice system as a
whole. 6 The concept of the CSI Infection recognizes the multiple areas
that the alleged 7 CSI Effect impacts, including areas before the verdict,
not just the verdict itself. The entire criminal litigation process is
potentially influenced by the fear that the CSI Effect has created a
population of "CSI Infected Jurors" that respond to the criminal case
and its evidence in different and unexpected ways. This review will
address the CSI Infection phenomenon through a discussion of real

cases, real experiences of litigators, real commentary by jurors, and real
trial and appellate rulings by judges on significant constitutional and
procedural issues of fair trial related to the CSI Effect. For example, is

it appropriate for prosecutors to change their presentation of evidence to
a strategy of defensive prosecution based on the perceived fear of CSI
Infected Jurors? 8 Does it lower the government's burden of proof when
the court or the prosecution tells the jury that the case does not have to
be proven with CSI-type evidence? 9 Is it appropriate to ask a testifying

Affects The Public's Expectations About Real Forensic Science, 47 JURIMETRICS J. 357, 358
(2007).
5. Marcia A. Mardis, It's Not Just Whodunnit But How: "The CSI Effect," Science Learning,
and the School Library, 35 KNOWLEDGE QUEST 12, 12 (Sept./Oct. 2006) (referencing a national
survey of middle and high school teachers in 2004 which found that 77% of these educators
taught forensic techniques in the science classroom, which they directly attributed to the
popularity of the CS! television show). The popularity of the show has extended beyond high
school and college campuses into other areas of leisure and entertainment. See Elderhostel:
Learning,
Lifelong
in
Adventures
http://www.elderhostel.org/programs/search-res.asp?keyword=csi (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
One can take a CSI learning vacation. Id. Elderhostel offers three to five day immersion
vacations on the subject for adults and children across the country. Id. One can purchase and
play, for less than twenty-dollars, the CSI board game. See CSI: Crime Scene Investigation The
Board Game, http://www.amazon.com/CSI-Crime-Scene-Investigation-Board/dp/B0018H66M
(last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
6. This Article addresses CSI Infection during the trial phase of the litigation process and
before the verdict. However, the CSI Infection can be found at earlier stages of the case, such as
the charging phase, wherein prosecutorial discretion is exercised regarding which charges to file,
if any, and at the plea bargaining phase regarding which cases to negotiate to lesser charges and
which to present to the jury. The prosecutor's perception of how the jury will receive certain
forensic evidence or the lack of forensic evidence in a particular case now, more than ever before,
colors the prosecutor's exercise of discretion on pre-trial decisions.
7. Shelton et al., supra note 1, at 335-36; Tyler, supra note 1, at 1053.
8. State v. Cooke, 914 A.2d 1078, 1088 (Del. Super. Ct. 2007) (finding that in order to counter
vulnerability to defense arguments of insufficient investigative and scientific testing, "prosecutors
now are almost required to engage in . . . 'defensive prosecution"').
9. See United States v. Harrington, 204 F. App'x 784, 788-89 (ll th Cir. 2006); Drake v.
State, 975 A.2d 204, 208-12 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009) (holding that the trial judge's voir dire
questions asking whether, in light of their experiences with fictional television dramas,
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crime scene analyst if his job is like CSI?' 0 Can litigants make
reference to CSI during voir dire, opening statement, or closing
argument? 1' Can a cross-examination or closing argument be curtailed
by the court due to fears that CSI Infected Jurors will misconstrue
certain evidence or argument? 12 Are new and special jury instructions
needed to explain the law as well as the task of fact finding to the
modem jury-a potentially CSI Infected jury? 13 Is it appropriate to ask
14
prospective jurors about their television viewing habits?
Correspondingly, is it valid to excuse a juror from15serving because he or
she watches too many crime shows on television?
These are the types of substantive legal questions that the courts must
consider in the age of the CSI Infection. This Article articulates the
prospective jurors could still convict a defendant without "evidence of scientific quality" was not
improper); State v. Ash, No. A07-0761, 2008 WL 2965555, at *7 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2008)
(finding the prosecutor's comment in rebuttal closing about CSI Effect was not prosecutorial
misconduct); Goff v. State, 14 So. 3d 625, 652-53 (Miss. 2009) (holding that the prosecutor's
reference to CS! in closing was not an error).
10. See State v. Swope, 762 N.W.2d 725, 729 n.3 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008) (providing an example
of the defense tactic of triggering the jury's pop cultural references instead of focusing on the
actual testimony from the expert witness).
11. See Harrington,204 F. App'x at 788-89 (holding that "the district court's comments that
'CSI' evidence would not be required to convict Harrington" was not an abuse of discretion);
Mathis v. State, No. 25, 2006, 2006 WL 2434741, at *4 (Del. Aug. 21, 2006) (finding mention of
CSI Effect comment in opening statement allowable); Boatswain v. State, No. 408, 2004, 2005
WL 1000565, at *1-2 (Del. Apr. 21, 2006) (discussing the prosecutor's question during closing
argument: "Can they meet CSI?"); Ash, 2008 WL 2965555, at *7 (finding the prosecutor's
comment in rebuttal closing about CSI Effect was not prosecutorial misconduct); Goff, 14 So. 3d
at 652-53 (holding that prosecutor's reference to CSI in closing was not error).
12. Evans v. State, 922 A.2d 620, 628 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007) (instructing jurors via
curative jury instruction that the government is not required to utilize specific investigative
techniques or scientific tests); Boatswain, 2005 WL 1000565, at *1-2; Ash, 2008 WL 2965555, at
*7 (finding prosecutor's comment in rebuttal closing about CSI Effect was not prosecutorial
misconduct); Goff, 14 So. 3d at 652-53 (holding that prosecutor's reference to CSI in closing was
not error).
13. Evans, 922 A.2d at 628 (instructing jurors via curative jury instruction that the
government is not required to utilize specific investigative techniques or scientific tests); see also
infra Part TIl.A.2-3 (discussing the instruction of jurors before and after all the evidence).
14. See Harrington,204 F. App'x at 788-89.
15. People v. Wells, 850 N.E.2d 637, 642 (N.Y. 2006) (finding the prosecutor's use of a
peremptory challenge to excuse an African-American female juror who stated she frequently read
mystery novels survived a Batson challenge with the court accepting the prosecutor's explanation
of the CSI Effect as his race neutral reason for striking the juror). Cf United States v. Hendrix,
No. 06-CR-0054-C-01, 2006 WL 3488970 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 30, 2006) (finding that watching CS!
alone was not a valid race-neutral reason to survive a Batson challenge for excluding African
American jurors. However, CS! watching coupled with the information that the juror also had a
relative in prison provided a sufficient race-neutral basis for excluding the African American
juror). The Hendrix court further stated: "It is possible that because shows such as CSI rely
heavily on scientific evidence in solving crimes, jurors that watch these shows expect the
government to produce similar evidence in any criminal case." Id. at *5.
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essence of the concerns being raised by litigants as well as the judicial
response by the trial and appellate courts. This Article provides needed
analysis of the constitutional and procedural ramifications of the court
rulings on these important yet increasingly routine issues in modem
criminal jury trials. Further, the Article questions whether certain
remedial measures contained in recent rulings are consistent with the
constitutional strictures of fair trial and due process.
There is a delicate adversarial balance in criminal litigation. For the
public's safety, the prosecution must be given a legitimate opportunity
to present and prove its case with whatever evidence is available. That
evidence must be weighed without preconceived biases. At the same
time, the accused's presumption of innocence must be protected, and a
fair opportunity to challenge any evidence presented against him must
be facilitated by courts. One of the obstacles courts face in dealing with
litigants' reactions to the fear of CSI Infected Jurors is to refrain from
tipping the delicate balance to unconstitutionally favor any one party.
Every criminal defendant is entitled to a fair trial. 16 This Sixth
Amendment 1 7 constitutional right is inextricably linked to the analysis
18
of the CSI Infection and its impact upon criminal prosecutions.
Therefore, this discussion is pivotal to justice. It is imperative for
judges to prevent litigants from using tactics that infringe on the fairness
of the trial. 19 Moreover, judges must institute procedural safeguards to
combat the CSI Infection's potential to derail a fair trial. If ignored, the
CSI Infection may induce inaccurate verdicts, which then impose upon
society a very high cost. 20 When factually guilty violent criminals are
acquitted because the jury misinterpreted or improperly weighed the
evidence, the safety of the public is compromised. 2 ' When factually
16. See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV.
17. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV.
18.

U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV.

19. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV.
20. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; see also infra Part II.B (providing an example of what
drives litigants' belief that CSI Infected Jurors exist).

21. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (articulating the proof beyond a reasonable
doubt standard for criminal trials). The founding idea of the American criminal justice system is
that it is "far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." Id. at 372
(Harlan, J., concurring). Notwithstanding the fact that most cases reported as having been
impacted by the CSI Effect are false acquittals, the American criminal justice system is better
equipped to bear the burden of a false acquittal than a wrongful conviction. Keith A. Findley,
Toward a New Paradigm of Criminal Justice: How the Innocence Movement Merges Crime
Control and Due Process, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 133, 138 (2008) (identifying false acquittals as a

minor problem compared to wrongful conviction). "Thus, failure to convict the guilty is a serious
problem, but this failure is not inherently the equivalent of wrongfully convicting the innocent,
either as a matter of constitutional priority or sound policy judgment." Id.
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innocent individuals are convicted due to the same type of juror
confusion, a more severe injury to society occurs. Both mistakes
jeopardize the legitimacy of the criminal justice system. 2 2 However,
23
wrongful convictions are inherently more repugnant to justice.
Some scholarly observers and experts criticize the entire theory and
doubt the existence of the CSI Effect. 24 Critics highlight the lack of
empirical data supporting the conclusion that television shows actually
impact jurors' decisions. 25 Proponents point to jurors' statements and
illogical, or surprising verdicts as sufficient evidence to prove that the
CSI Effect is real and worthy of remedial attention. Although much is
made of the debate about the existence of the CSI Effect, empirical
studies may never fully be able to explain how, and to what extent, the
CSI Effect influences jurors. Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that
scholars can neither affirmatively prove, nor effectively explain away
the CSI Effect, court pleadings establish that the CSI Infection exists
within modern criminal litigation. 2 6 Thus, while debate continues, and
22. Findley, supra note 21, at 138; see also infra Part II (discussing action within the criminal
justice system).
23. Donald J. Sorochan, Wrongful Convictions: Preventing Miscarriages of Justice, Some
Case Studies, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 93, 112-13 (2008) (comparing Justice William Blackstone's
comment "that it is better for ten guilty men to go free than one innocent man be condemned to
the gallows" to the former Communist leader of Cambodia, Pol Pot's, comment "[hie who
protests is an enemy; he who opposes is a corpse! ... You can arrest someone by mistake; never
release him by mistake. . . . Better to kill an innocent by mistake than spare an enemy by
mistake! ... Better to arrest ten innocent people by mistake than free a single guilty party! ...
No gain in keeping no loss in weeding out."). See also Findley, supra note 21, at 138.
24. See CSI and Its Effects, supra note 1, at 463; Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa,
Investigating the 'CSI Effect' Effect: Media and Litigation Crisis in Criminal Law, 61 STAN. L.
REV. 1335, 1342 (2009); Shelton et al., supra note 1, at 362. Although there are several
remaining open questions about CSI Infected Juror behavior, there is significant research to
support that watching fictional crime shows on television has an impact on its viewers. See Sarah
Eschholz, The Media and Fear of Crime: A Survey of the Research, 9 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
37, 46-47 (1997). Eight out of the eleven studies concluded that the viewers of the television
crime shows Law & Order, Cagney & Lacey, and Hill Street Blues, were impacted by their
viewing. Id. at 45-46. Six studies found viewers had increased anxiety from watching these
shows, and two studies found reduced anxiety in viewers. Id.
25. CSI and Its Effects, supra note 1, at 436; cf Tyler, supra note I (citing psychology studies
supporting the contrary premise that television can influence jurors). Nevertheless, the opinions
of the "individuals in the courtroom" are drastically different from the opinions of the critical
observers "outside the courtroom." MARICOPA COUNTY ATT'Ys OFFICE, CSI: MARICOPA
COUNTY: THE CSI EFFECT AND ITS REAL-LIFE IMPACT ON JUSTICE 2 (June 30, 2005), available
at http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/jc2008/references/csi/CSIEffect-report.pdf.
26. See Podlas, supra note 1. See also CSI and Its Effects, supra note 1; Shelton et al., supra
note 1, at 332-33 (analyzing the questionnaire responses of 1027 potential jurors). Nevertheless,
empirical study of the CSI Effect is still early and ongoing. Id.; cf Schweitzer & Saks, supra note
4, at 358, 363 (discussing how CSI viewers are more critical of forensic science evidence when
presented at trial and find it less believable; however, there is no statistically significant
difference between their likelihood to convict).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 41

more empirical analysis is conducted, courtrooms are addressing the
issues and the perceived manifestations and mutations of the alleged
CSI Effect.
The concern for and impact of the CSI Effect permeates modern
criminal trials. Litigators and judges are forced to deal with it. Motions
are based on it, and trial strategies are built around it. Further, judges
issue rulings directed at its operation in their real cases and real juries.
The CSI Infection is now inside the courtroom in a way that can no
longer be ignored.2 7
This Article seeks to appropriately change the focus of the CSI Effect
debate. It will expand the conversation beyond the speculated impact
that is based solely upon the rise and fall of acquittal and conviction
rates. 2 8 Instead, the approach taken here will analyze how CSI, as a
larger popular culture phenomenon, infects criminal trials at all levels of
the criminal justice process. It appears from all accounts by the actual
participants in the day-to-day workings of the criminal justice system,
that the television show CSI, and shows like it, have immeasurably
29
changed the way criminal litigation is conducted today.
Identifying and eliminating any harm that results from the CSI
Infection within criminal litigation is the ultimate goal of this research.
It contributes practical relevance to the discussion of the CSI Effect by
utilizing a thorough analysis of current and real cases, and it
concentrates on how judges adjudicate the evidentiary, procedural, and
constitutional issues surrounding the CSI Effect.
Following this
Introduction, Part II describes the perceived heightened expectation of
30
jurors, and perceived fears by litigants, that the CSI Effect creates.
Part II is important to this Article because it exposes the perspectives of
criminal litigators who interact daily with jurors. Part III illuminates
real cases and contains the constitutional and procedural essence of this
Article. 3 1 Questions of selecting unbiased jurors, instructing them
properly on the law of the case, and procedures of the court are tackled.
Moreover, issues regarding how evidence and arguments are presented
to the jury are explored to provide valid remedies that are in accord with
the requirements of due process. Significant consideration is given to
whether the current remedial measures devised by the courts to prevent
potential harm by CSI Infected Jurors are consistent with paramount

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See infra Part IV (discussing the distortion of evidence by the CS! Infection).
Cole & Dioso-Villa, supra note 24, at 1356-64.
See infra Part II (discussing CSI Infection in action within the criminal justice system).
See infra Part I1 (discussing CS! Infection in action within the criminal justice system).
See infra Part HI (discussing CSI Infection at various phrases of trial).
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principles of fairness as prescribed by the fair trial guarantees of the
Constitution. This Article suggests utilizing a special jury instruction to
help minimize potential juror confusion and evidence distortion-the
special instruction would warn jurors not to use information gained
from fictional sources in their consideration and deliberation of the
evidence. Part IV discusses the multiple cultural factors impacting the
modem American jury. 3 2 Factors in addition to the CSI Effect can
conflate and distort a juror's otherwise clear view of the evidence. In
conclusion, Part V highlights that this Article bridges the gap between
the theoretical CSI Effect debate and litigants' practical encounters with
33
jurors in everyday criminal trials.
II. FEARS REGARDING CSI INFECTED JURORS
Criminal justice statistics indicate that only a small percentage of
criminal cases go to trial and reach a jury verdict. 34 At first glance, ten
percent may appear to be a small percentage of the overall criminal
justice caseload. However, cases that proceed to jury trial carry the
highest stakes and most severe punishments; allegations often include
violent rape or murder. 3 5 For this reason, addressing the CSI Infection
is a paramount concern. The risk of false acquittals and wrongful
convictions threatens public safety as well as the constitutional rights of
the accused.3 6 This is problematic because the legitimacy of the

American criminal justice system relies on juries to arrive at a just
result. 37 Although the accuracy rate of juries can never be one hundred
32. See infra Part IV (discussing various other factors affecting the modern juror).
33. See infra Part V (concluding).
34. Nancy Jean King, The American Criminal Jury, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 59
(1999) (highlighting that only a fraction of criminal cases actually go all the way to jury trialapproximately three to ten percent).
35. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 217995, STATE COURT
SENTENCING
OF CONVICTED
FELONS, 2004
STATISTICAL
TABLES
(2007),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/htmlscscfO4/tables/scs04401tab.htm
(indicating only three
percent of convictions resulted from jury trials in U.S. state courts). Of the three percent of
convictions resulting from jury trials in U.S. state courts, over half were violent crimes such as
murder, sexual assault, and robbery. Id.
36. Edson R. Sunderland, Verdict, General and Special, 29 Yale L.J. 253, 262 (1920) (stating
that the need for correct jury decision making and the desire to avoid the appearance of error
requires that "[t]he record . .. be absolutely flawless, but such a result is possible only by
concealing, not by excluding mistakes").
37. See also FED. R. EVID. 606(b) ("Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or
indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the
jury's deliberations of to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as
influencing the juror ....). See generally Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987) (holding
evidence of juror intoxication during the trial
and deliberations was insufficient to reverse jury
verdict). The Tanner Court stated: "There is little doubt that post verdict investigation into juror
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percent, anything that increases the possibility of error in an already
imperfect system is important to investigate.
Some believe that the regular viewing of fictional crime shows, like
CSI, manipulates jurors 38 into considering real cases "through a
misleading prism of fiction," which may skew them into reaching
"conclusions contrary to justice." 39 Jury trials have always required
40
litigants to carefully navigate the delicate psyche of the lay fact-finder.
Today, however, a successful trial lawyer must effectively traverse
beyond the fixed opinions and pre-judgments that jurors often have
before hearing the case. This requires jurors to dislodge themselves
from romanticized notions of crime scene investigations and scientific
forensic evidence.
Instead, jurors must undertake the unfamiliar,
perhaps uncomfortable, role of fact-finder, which is a complex job
because not every factual question or concern will be answered in a real
criminal trial.4 1 This is the unpleasant reality of real crimes,4 2 the plot
misconduct would in some instances lead to the invalidation of verdicts reached after
irresponsible or improper juror behavior. It is not at all clear, however, that the jury system could
survive such efforts to perfect it." Id. at 120.
38. Schweitzer & Saks, supra note 4, at 358.
39. MARICOPA COUNTY A1r'YS OFFICE, supra note 25, at 2 (surveying everyday prosecutors

and their opinions about whether the juries they encounter are CS! Infected); see also Andrew P.
Thomas, The CSI Effect: Fact or Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 70 (2006), available at

http://www.thepocketpart.org/2006/02/thomas.html. Based on a survey of Maricopa County
prosecutors, many prosecutors experienced heightened jury expectation for forensic evidence and
believe that shows like CSI "can create a bias in the jury if not properly addressed at trial." Id. at
70.
40.

GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH:

A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN

AMERICA 205-06 (2003). Unpredictability of the jury verdict is one factor that drives the high
percentage of plea bargains, a fact that is often criticized as a weakness of the criminal justice
system. Id. It is considered a weakness because individuals often plead guilty. Id.
41. People v. Williams, 21 P.3d 1209, 1216 (Cal. 2001) (finding that jurors are required to
follow the court's instructions). In United States v. Battiste, the court stated:
[I]t [is] the most sacred constitutional right of every party accused of a crime, that the
jury should respond as to the facts, and the court as to the law. It is the duty of the
court to instruct the jury as to the law; and it is the duty of the jury to follow the law, as
it is laid down by the court. This is the right of every citizen; and it is his only
protection.... Every person accused as a criminal has a right to be tried according to
the law of the land, the fixed law of the land; and not by the law as a jury may
understand it, or choose, from wantonness, or ignorance, or accidental mistake, to
interpret it.
United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042, 1043 (C.C.D. Mass 1835) (No. 14,545). See also
JAMES

Q.

WHITMAN, THE ORIGINS OF REASONABLE DOUBT: THEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF THE

CRIMINAL TRIAL 10 (2008) (confronting the historical fact-finders' moral discomfort with
rendering final judgment in a criminal case). In a criminal case, the jury must find all material
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
42.

See Richard Willing, 'CSI Effect' Has Juries Wanting More Evidence, USA TODAY, Aug.

5, 2004, at IA.
[R]eal scientists say CSI's main fault is this: The science is always above reproach.
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is unscripted, and no professional actors deliver the scenes. 43 In order
to achieve a just result predicated on realistic and logical inferences
from the real case evidence, litigants must overcome the modem juror's
heightened expectations and even their misinformation from fictional
sources. The perception is that the prevailing party must potentially
convince a CSI Infected Juror.
This Article targets a new area within the CSI Effect discussion. It
spotlights the major legal impact that the supposition of a CSI Infected
Juror makes within the criminal litigation process; this includes jury
selection, presentation of evidence, and potentially even the ultimate
verdict. Not only have the strategies and arguments of trial lawyers on
both sides significantly changed; in fact, trial and appellate courts have
also made evidentiary, procedural, and constitutional rulings to address
the perceived dangers that CSI Infected Jurors impose upon the ultimate
fairness of the jury trial process.

"You never see a case where the sample is degraded or the lab work is faulty or the test
results don't solve the crime," says Dan Krane, president and DNA specialist at
Forensic Bioinformatics in Fairborn, Ohio. "These things happen all the time in the
real world."
Id.
43. DiFonzo & Stem, supra note 1, at 504-05 (stating: "In the world of CS!, valuable forensic
evidence is there for the taking. It is never contaminated, and human error never compromises its
analysis.").
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Many anecdotal juror,4 4 litigator, 4 5 and judicial comments4 6 reveal
that media and popular culture47 influence jurors' expectations.4 8 Some
scholars assert that media and culture have always impacted jurors and
that the CSI television show is no different than science fiction
literature, mystery novels, or the Perry Mason and Matlock television

shows. 49 Although it is true these other forms of popular fiction did

precede CSI and Law and Order, the force and scope of the older, more
traditional and lower-tech versions of the crime drama never reached the

sophistication, popularity, or universal cultural reference of CSI. It is
almost like asserting that the telegraph and the Internet are essentially
44. See, e.g., Kit R. Roane, The CSI Effect, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 25, 2005, at 48
(reporting the grave results of a forensically disappointed jury). A gang member, on trial for rape,
faced a mountain of prosecutorial evidence in court. Id. The jury, however, was disappointed
that the investigators did not test evidence to confirm that dirt found in the victim's body matched
soil from the crime. Id. These jurors were convinced such a test existed because they learned on
CSI that such police tests were possible. Id.; see also Jane Ann Morrison, "CSI Effect" May
Have Led Binion Jurors to Demand HarderEvidence, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Dec. 2, 2004, at lB.
In Binion, Las Vegas jurors heard evidence pertaining to a case whose facts achieved much
notoriety.
Id.
See CSI Show Guide: Season Two, Episode, #01, available at
http://www.episodelist.com/site/index.php?go=seasons.view&season-id=226.
The sophomore
season of the hit crime drama began with an episode remarkably similar to the Binion case,
involving the death of a popular Las Vegas casino executive. Id.
45. Michael J. Watkins, Forensics In the Media: Have Attorneys Reacted to the Growing
Popularity of Forensic Crime Dramas? (Aug. 3, 2004) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Florida State
University), http://www.coolings.net/education/papers/Capstone-Electronic.pdf; see also Jimmy
Bunn Jr., The CSI-Factor: A Problem or an Opportunity?, THE SOURCE, Spring 2005, at 4,
availableat http://www.ok.gov/osbi/documents/Spring%202005.pdf.
46. See Ty McMahan, Real Life Meets 'CS!': Television Dramas Leave Fingerprintson Local
Juries' Expectations, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, May 2, 2005, at IA. This article points to Judge Jerry
Bass, who believes, "if he watches television shows like CS!: Crime Scene Investigation, so do
many of his jurors, which is why questions about television viewing habits have become standard
during jury selection." Id. Judge Bass is an example of judges who understand that "the new
challenge in [the] courtroom is making sure jurors understand the difference between television
and reality." Id.
47. David Ray Papke, The Impact of Popular Culture on American Perceptionsof the Courts,
82 IND. L.J. 1225, 1226 (2007) (defining popular culture as "cultural commodities and
experiences produced by the culture industry and marketed to mass audiences").
48. See generally National Clearinghouse for Science, Technology, and the Law,
Bibliography
of
Resources
Related
to
CSI
Effect,
http://www.ncstl.org/education/CSI%20Effect%20Bibliography (last visited Aug. 7, 2009).
Hundreds of newspaper and magazine articles have reported on individual cases wherein the CSI
Effect was cited as the reason for the jury's acquittal-often quoting juror statements regarding
the lack of forensic proof like DNA, fingerprints, or other definitive proof, also known as "CSItype evidence." Id. In addition to the anecdotal quotes of jurors, prosecutors and defenders have
been surveyed and consistently report their belief in a CSI Effect impacting the jury. Id. Some
judges have echoed the same sentiment in their court rulings and interviews. Telephone
Interview with Marcia G. Cooke, Judge, U.S. District Court (Feb. & June 2007) [hereinafter
Cooke Interview]. However, the views among the judges are mixed. See MARICOPA COUNTY
ATr'YS OFFICE, supra note 25.
49. See Cole & Dioso, supra note 1, at W13.
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the same because they both allow individuals to communicate with each
other just like before-nothing has changed. While it is true the
Internet facilitates e-mails just like the telegraph facilitated telegrams
allowing individuals to communicate, the speed, volume, and manner of
communication has totally transformed because of the Internet.
50
Additionally, the influence of the Internet created a cultural change.
In a similar way, the enthusiasm for and influence of the modem
criminal investigation shows entered a new dimension in the last
decade. 5 1 The emergence and popularity 52 of the television shows Law
and Order and CSI tutor the American viewing public in criminal law
from a pro-law enforcement vantage point. These shows are purposely
skewed for entertainment value 53 and unrestrained by the Federal Rules

50. See Mardis, supra note 5, at 12 (reporting that middle and high school science classes
have changed); Willing, supra note 42, at IA (noting that the popularity of forensic science as a
college major has increase). CSI themed vacations are now available. See Elderhostel:
Adventures in Lifelong Learning, supra note 5. A board game has been developed to allow you
to play CSI at home.
5 1. Something similar to the CSI Effect has been an issue as early as the airing of the show
Perry Mason. See Michael Mann, The "CSI Effect": Better Jurors through Television and
Science?, 24 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 211, 213-14 (2005-06) (explaining that the "Perry Mason
Syndrome" refers to the hit TV show, and "describes the expectations on defense attorneys to
coerce an admission from the prosecution's star witness upon cross-examination"). At times,
comparisons are made between the "Perry Mason Syndrome" and the CSI Effect. Id. at 220 n.36.
However, the impact of these popular televisions shows is very different. Id. at 221-22. On
Perry Mason, the expected result was the magic bullet of the defense attorney getting the
prosecution's witness to confess to lying, therefore exonerating the defendant. Id. As presented
in the plot of the Perry Mason show, the accused was factually innocent. Id. However, aspects
of the dramatic presentation of Perry Mason's witness examining techniques began to feed real
jurors' expectations at the time. See Amy Lennard Goehner et al., Where CSI Meets Real Law
and Order, TIME, Nov. 8, 2004, at 69. Perry Mason used to lean in on the witness box as he
questioned a witness, despite the fact that real trial procedure at the time required attorneys to
remain at their podium while questioning took place. Id. Nonetheless, because jurors saw how
Mason talked to witnesses, they thought something was wrong with lawyers who did not
approach the witness in the same way. Id. This is similar to the unrealistic depictions of criminal
investigations on crime dramas that modern jurors are coming to expect in a real court room. See
State v. Swope, 762 N.W.2d 725, 729 n.3 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008). The argument surrounding the
CSI Effect is different. The "Perry Mason Syndrome" represents the lawyer who realizes he has
not been able to measure up to the fictional Perry Mason. See Fred Graham, The Impact of
Television on the Jury System: Ancient Myths and Modern Realism, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 623, 628
(1990-91). The CSI Effect, on the other hand, may involve an accused who is factually guilty, a
prosecutor whose case lacks forensic evidence, and a jury induced to falsely acquit. See DiFonzo
& Stern, supra note 1, at 508-11. Conversely, the CSI Effect may involve an accused who is
factually innocent, a prosecutor who presents forensic evidence, and a jury induced to wrongfully
convict. Id.
See also Law & Order,
52. See Nielsen Ratings, supra note 2 (rating CSI sixth).
http://www.nbc.com/Law-andOrder/about (last visited Aug. 8, 2009) (noting that Law & Order
is not only the longest running crime based drama, but also the second longest running drama "in
the history of television").
53. David Berman and Jon Wellner are actors and writers for CSI: Crime Scene Investigation.
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of Evidence or Ethical Rules of Professional Conduct.5 4 Yet, in real

life, the jury is picked from a group of individuals very familiar with the
format and content of the fictional version of criminal investigations,
evidence gathering, crime solving, and prosecutions. 55 However, these
shows fail to present the reality of criminal investigations, such as crime
lab backlogs 5 6 and resource limitations, which real criminal
investigators and litigators must surmount. A potential juror's exposure
to this distorted version of the prosecutorial process prior to jury service
shapes his or her understanding and expectations.
Additionally, fictional television depictions of criminal investigations
and prosecutions are not required to follow the mandatory limitations

David Berman & Jon Wellner, "Inside the World of CSI: Crime Scene Investigation,"
Presentation at the Eighth Annual Forensic Science and Law Conference: A National Symposium
on the Intersection of Forensic Science and Popular Culture, Cyril H. Wecht Institute of Forensic
Science and Law, Duquesne University (Apr. 5, 2008) [hereinafter National Symposium]. They
gave a presentation at the Eighth Annual Forensic Science and Law Conference, April 2008, in
which they articulated that "all ideas for the show come from real forensic evidence theories, but
for television purposes the procedures are either exaggerated or dramatized for entertainment
value." Id. However, Berman and Wellman admit this rule was not one hundred percent
followed in early episodes; for example, there was an episode in CSI's first season that showed
that a plaster mold of a knife wound could be made to replicate the actual knife used to stab the
victim. See CS! Crime Scene Investigation: $35K O.B.O., (CBS television broadcast Mar. 29,
2001). Berman and Wellman elaborated that in real life it is possible to make a plaster mold of
the exterior wound only. See National Symposium, supra. Unlike what is indicated in the
episode, it is not possible to make a plaster cast of an interior knife wound in order to identify the
kind of knife used. Id. Although this might appear to be a slight creative license, in actuality it
can misinform real jurors about what forensic science can prove. See Papke, supra note 47, at
1232.
54. See generally CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE: WITH ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTES AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (2008). The
Federal Rules of Evidence, which is adopted in whole or in part by most states, regulates the
information the jury is allowed to hear. Id. The rules require evidence to be relevant, reliable,
and not unfairly prejudicial before introducing it to the jury. FED. R. EVID. 401. Many of the
most sensational or entertaining facts are thereby excluded in a real case. See, e.g., FED. R. EvtD.
1101 (articulating the specific courts and proceedings to which the federal rules of evidence
apply).
55. See Craig M. Cooley, Reforming the Forensic Science Community to Avert the Ultimate
Injustice, 15 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 381, 388 (2004) (stating: "The point is that the American
public, if not the world, is being perpetually inundated with distorted perceptions of forensic
science's capabilities."); see also Catherine M. Guthrie, The CSI Effect: Legitimate Concern or
Popular Myth?, 41 PROSECUTOR 14, 14 (July/Aug. 2007) (describing CSI-type shows as
"glorify[ing], simplify[ing] and sometimes flat out distort[ing] the use of scientific evidence in
crime solving").
56. Travis Pratt et al., This Isn't CSI: Estimating the NationalBacklog of Forensic DNA Case
and the BarriersAssociated with Case Processing, 17 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 32, 32 (2006);
Joseph Varlaro & Barry Duceman, Dealing with Increasing Casework Demands for DNA
Analysis,
5
PROFILES
IN
DNA
(Sept.
2002),
available
at
https://www.promega.de/profiles/502/ProfilesinDNA 502-03.pdf.
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and requirements imposed by the United States Constitution.5 7 Real
prosecutors are bound by these limitations 58 in order to ensure fairness
throughout the entire criminal litigation process. 5 9 Potentially, these
shows sway more than juror expectations; specifically, they may color a
juror's analysis of the real evidence presented in court, 60 as well as
influence the amount of evidentiary value placed upon certain items of
proof.6 1
Thus, CSI Infected Jurors may have unusually high
57. U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, VI. The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the United
States Constitution place strict limitations on the way the government can investigate crimes and
question citizens regarding their potential involvement in criminal actions. Id. The Fourth
Amendment limits the government's ability to invade one's privacy and further mandates that the
government may not search or seize items or a person, unless it is done reasonably, based upon
probable cause and a warrant obtained by a neutral and detached magistrate. See U.S. CONST.
amend. IV.; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1967). The Fifth Amendment limits
police officers from conducting custodial interrogations without advising an individual that
he/she has the fight to remain silent and the right to have an attorney present during questioning.
U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966). The Sixth
Amendment protects the ultimate fairness of the criminal trial process, which includes: (1) rules
governing pre-trial interrogations; (2) identifications of the formally charged criminal defendant;
(3) procedures during trial to ensure fairness, such as providing indigent criminal defendants with
a court appointed lawyer to effectively defend them against the allegations; (4) making sure the
judge and jury are neutral and unbiased fact-finders; (5) ensuring that the jury affirmatively
understands the defendant is cloaked with the presumption of innocence and that the in-court
adversarial tactics by the prosecution do not undermine that right; (6) and requiring the
government to prove all the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See
generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97-98 (1986) (addressing the accused's right to a fair
jury of one's peers without discriminatory exclusion of certain potential jurors); In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (articulating the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard for criminal
trials); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (explaining the criminal defendant's right
to a fair trial of his peers); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (prohibiting the
government's elicitation of post-indictment confessions); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
344-45 (1963) (mandating the appointment of counsel in felony jury trials). These matters of
constitutional law significantly impact the way real criminal cases are investigated and
prosecuted, yet in no way inhibit how fictional versions of real cases are depicted for
entertainment purposes on television. See generallyUnited States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113
(1984) (articulating that constitutional restrictions only apply to official government agents and
their representatives, not private actors).
58. See R. MICHAEL CASSIDY, PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS 15 (2005) (referencing the probable
cause standard for prosecution articulated in ABA Model Rule 3.8).
59. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment requires equal protection of the
laws and forbids governmental discrimination in the enforcement of its laws. Id.; see also
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987) (challenging Georgia's death penalty scheme as
intentionally discriminatory). This amendment protects fairness in certain pre-trial issues such as
a prosecutor's decision to file criminal charges. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 60708 (1985); see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464-65 (1996).
60. Papke, supra note 47, at 1227 ("Cultivation theorists argue that regular viewers of
television programming or avid consumers of other varieties of popular culture come to see social
reality differently."); see also DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 1, at 507 (outlining that the most
significant problem with the CSI Effect is its adverse consequences "on the process of evaluating
the corpus of evidence at trial").
61. DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 1, at 508 (referencing dialogue from an episode of CSI to
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expectations for the evidence they believe should be presented, and they

may have strong opinions regarding the absence of such evidence in
trials. 62 Although it is still unclear how alleged heightened expectations
and fictional understandings of forensic science are ultimately resolved

by each individual jury, one possibility is that information learned from
fictional sources, remaining unsatisfied after all the real evidence has
been presented, creeps into jury deliberations. The two dreaded
consequences of this scenario are that: (1) due to unrealistic
expectations the jury will remain unsatisfied after all the real evidence

highlight that CSI-type shows skew jurors' views regarding the value of certain types of evidence
by devaluing low tech and over-valuing high tech forensic science evidence). "Detective Jim
Brass: 'We got the eyewitnesses lined up, ready to go.' Gil Grissom: 'Testimonials, Jim? I don't
consider that evidence."' Id. (quoting CSI Crime Scene Investigation: Blood Lust (CBS
television
broadcast
Dec.
5,
2002),
available
at
http://www.crimelab.nl/transcripts.php?series=l&season=3&episode=9);
see also Cynthia Di
Pasquale, Beyond the Smoking Gun, DAILY RECORD, Sept. 8, 2006, at 1, available at
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/faculty/conferences/conf40/Beyondthesmokinggun.pdf (reporting
a criminal prosecution wherein multiple eye witnesses observed and testified that they saw the
accused shooter shoot and flee police; however, the jury failed to convict because the prosecution
did not pull fingerprints from the gun). "People always wanted a smoking gun ... But now, they
need the smoking gun, the smoke from the gun and a videotape of it." Id. Under the American
criminal justice model governed by Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, the judge makes
determinations of law, whereas the jury makes determinations of fact. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at
156-158; GRAHAM C. LILLY, PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE 21(4th ed. 2006). Therefore, the judge
decides the admissibility of the proffered evidence, but the jury decides the weight that will be
given to that evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 104; LILLY, supra, at 21. Based upon preconceived
notions regarding the value of certain types of evidence, the jury could in fact erroneously place
the incorrect amount of weight on a given piece of evidence. See Willing, supra note 42, at IA.
For example, in most of the criminal investigation shows forensic science evidence is routinely
collected, quickly tested, and then shown in the episode to effectively prove the perpetrator of the
crime without any doubt. Id. "The programs also foster ... the mistaken notion that criminal
science is fast and infallible and always gets its man ....
Real crime scene investigators say that
because of the programs, people often have unrealistic ideas of what criminal science can
deliver." Id. This repeated portrayal could lead the average viewer to think that forensic science
evidence is always collected, quickly tested, and never incorrectly identifies a suspect. Id. This
incorrect, yet commonly held, assumption about forensic science evidence could influence the
amount of evidentiary value that a juror places on the forensic evidence in a real case, and could
also impact the juror's opinion regarding the importance of always having forensic science
evidence, i.e., any good and thorough criminal investigation would include a dusting for
fingerprint evidence, even if a fingerprint is completely irrelevant to the case. See Kate
Coscarelli, The CSI Effect: T. V. 's False Reality Fools Jurors,THE STAR-LEDGER, Apr. 18, 2005,
at 1.
62. See Paul Erwin Kish & Herbert Leon MacDonell, Absence of Evidence is Not Evidence of
Absence, 46 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 160, No. 2, (1996), http://www.crime-sceneinvestigator.net/absenceofevidence.htm. "Should no exculpatory evidence be discovered[,] the
absence of evidence is not evidence of absence." Id. In essence, this highlights the fact that the
absence of certain evidence may be meaningless, as well as the presence of certain evidence
being similarly meaningless. Id. In reality, it is the totality of the evidence that must be
examined, not the presence or absence of familiar types of proof which somehow hold "gold star
standard" reliability. Id.; see also Findley, supra note 21, at 138.
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has been presented, or (2) the evidence the jury expected to see based on
this misunderstanding of forensic evidence will improperly become
crucial to their decision-making process and potentially sway the verdict
in unexpected or illogical ways. 6 3 The true juridical query underlying
the fear of CSI Infected Jurors is that the jurors will not only violate
their oath, but also circumvent the constitutional rights of the accused as
well as procedural and evidentiary rules of criminal litigation and due
process.
A. Defining the Concern of JurorExpectation
Generally, when individuals speak about the CSI Effect, they are
referring to the perceived anti-prosecution impact of the phenomenon,
namely jurors rendering false acquittal verdicts. 64 The rationale for the
false acquittal is that the verdict was a mistake; it was a mistake based
either on a misunderstanding of the real evidence when compared to its
fictional, television counterpart, or because the jury held the prosecution
65
to the television standard of proof, not the real life standard of proof.
Tom Tyler pointed out in Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt6 6 that
it is unknown whether the CSI Effect has a "positive" or "negative"
impact upon a juror's ultimate decision. 6 7 Psychological studies of
jurors suggest that a CSI Effect is possible, but the effect could just as
68
easily induce wrongful convictions as it could induce false acquittals. 69
However, it may even aid the jury in reaching a correct result.
Therefore, it is critical to explore what occurs before the verdict; this
entails examining the multiple phases of the criminal litigation

63. Guthrie, supra note 55, at 15.
64. See generally JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE INLAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 2002) (exploring the application and use of social science terms,
methodology, and techniques in legal scholarship and in litigation). False acquittal is used here in
the same way a false negative would be defined in social science research. Id. Thus, under this
definition, a false acquittal would occur against the weight of the evidence and where the
defendant was factually guilty-acquitted by the jury based on an obvious misunderstanding or
evidentiary bias on the part of the jury. Specifically, this Article focuses on the juror's
misunderstanding or misinterpretation of facts as opposed to one's misunderstanding of the
instructed law.
65. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (articulating the proof beyond a reasonable doubt
standard for criminal trials).
66. Tyler, supra note 1, passim.
67. Id. at 1063. Thus, the viewpoint of this Article is that it is important to consider both
types of impacts the CSI Effect may have upon the criminal justice system.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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process. 70 In-depth focus on the criminal trial itself is necessary to
determine where and how the CSI Infection impacts results.
B. Example of What Drives Litigants' Belief that CSI Infected Jurors
Exist
Consider the following factual scenario: the DNA of the alleged
rapist's saliva is confirmed on the victim's breast, items of the accused
are found at the scene of the crime, positive eyewitness identification is
made by the victim, plus incriminating testimony from both the
emergency room nurse and the police officer is received. The jury is
asked to consider all of this evidence and decide whether the accused
raped the victim. Normally, this amount of evidence would be enough
to convict in the typical stranger-rape abduction case. However, in the
71
age of the CSI Infected Juror, a jury in Peoria, Illinois required more.
The above facts are from a real alleged rape case that occurred in
2004 and was later tried. 7 2 The victim was a sympathetic young
teenage girl; the defendant was a hardened gang member. 73 The jury
heard all the evidence, including the gold star of forensic proof-DNA
from saliva on the victim's body. Yet, the jurors remained unsatisfied;
they wanted more. In considering the substantive requirements of
criminal law and the charge of rape, one might query what more they
could have possibly wanted. In this case it is not a mystery what other
evidence they wanted. Based on the commentary of a juror after trial,
the jurors wanted more forensic evidence-specifically they wanted
the
74
victim's cervix tested for dirt to match the dirt at the crime scene.
The Peoria case is repeatedly cited as an example of the CSI Effect in
action because of the fanciful nature of the juror's comment and the
seemingly romantic attraction to forensic testing even though it had no
logical connection to the material elements of the case. The Peoria rape
case has become somewhat of a poster child for the principle that the
pop culture phenomenon of the CSI-type television show makes people
believe that forensic tests are instantly available to test anything and
70.

See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & LAURIE L. LEVENSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:

ADJUDICATION 9-10 (2008) (describing, in part, the sequence of events in a criminal
prosecution). Although there are additional phases to the criminal litigation process, this Article
will specifically focus on the following distinct parts of the criminal trial: jury selection, opening
statement, presentation of evidence, closing argument, jury instructions, and verdicts.
71. See Roane, supra note 44.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id. (noting that the jury entered a verdict of not-guilty because they were "[u]nmoved
by the DNA evidence, [and] felt police should have tested 'debris' found in the victim to see if it
matched soil from the park").
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everything, and further, that the lack of forensic tests indicates
insufficiency in the prosecution's proof. The Peoria case is a classic
example of jurors misunderstanding the necessity, or lack thereof, of
forensic evidence. Compounding the misunderstanding of what the
hypothetical forensic soil tests could prove, these jurors also exhibited
confusion about the required material elements of rape. One might
wonder if the confusion about the law and their task as jurors was
caused by a preconceived fascination with certain forensic tests they
expected but did not receive in this case. Cases like the Peoria rape case
confirm for many litigators that the alleged CSI Effect is all too real.
Critics who dispute the existence of the CSI Effect espouse that there
could be many untold reasons why the jury acquitted the defendant in
the Peoria rape case and that too much is being made of this one case.
However, according to the statement of a juror, there was one reason for
acquittal-the prosecution did not test the dirt found inside the victim
against the dirt at the crime scene. While it could have only been one
juror that felt strongly about that point, in a criminal litigation having
one juror that disagrees is enough to sway a verdict because criminal
75
convictions are solely based on unanimous verdicts.
In analyzing what the Peoria case means, it is also important to keep
in mind some additional procedural rules. The law protects the jury
from being required to explain its reasons for the verdict. Jurors are not
mandated to speak to anyone after the completion of a case and any
information revealed in debriefing after trial is purely voluntary on the
part of an individual juror. Thus, it is significant that at least one juror
in the Peoria case volunteered his or her reason behind the acquittal.
In a criminal case, the prosecution has the burden of proving all the
material elements of the charge "beyond a reasonable doubt." 7 6 Thus,
in order for a jury to acquit a defendant, the acquittal decision must be
based on reason. 77 The jury can only acquit if there is a reasonable
75. Thomas, supra note 39, at 71.
What may be of the greatest concern is what goes on in the jury room, after arguments
are made. In 72% of the cases, [the Maricopa County] prosecutors suspect that jurors
who watch shows like CSI claim a level of expertise during jury deliberations that
sway other jurors that do not watch those shows.
Id.
76. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (articulating the proof beyond a reasonable doubt
standard for criminal trials).
77. Although acquittals are not as thoroughly analyzed due to the inability of the prosecution
to appeal the verdict in the American criminal justice system, application of the reasonable doubt
standard requires both guilty and not guilty verdicts to be based upon reason. Therefore, false
acquittals, like those allegcd to occur due to the CSI Effect, are believed to be verdicts without
reason. See MONAHAN & WALKER, supra note 64.
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doubt regarding a material element of the charge. Reasonable doubt is
"a doubt based on reason, a doubt for which [one] can give a reason," 7 8
and not "mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human
affairs is open to some possible or imaginary doubt." 79 Moreover,
reasonable doubt "is not a fanciful doubt, nor a whimsical doubt, nor a
doubt based on conjecture . . . . The government is not required to
establish guilt beyond all doubt, or to a mathematical certainty or a
scientific certainty." 80 Therefore, when the Peoria jury entered its
verdict of not guilty, finding reasonable doubt in the proof on the charge
of rape, the reason upon which their doubt was based, according to the
juror's statement, was lack of forensic testing of the victim's cervix for
dirt matching the crime scene. This type of juror reasoning is illogical.
An analysis of the material elements of the rape charge this jury was
asked to consider may illuminate why the jurors' logic seems so very
flawed to many.
In Illinois, the crime of rape is defined as forced sex or sex without
consent. 8 1 Therefore the material elements that must be established by
the government are that the accused had some form of sex with the
victim by force or lack of consent of the victim. The only two issues
are sex and consent. The victim testified that she did not consent and
the sex with the defendant was forced. 82 The nurse who examined the
victim after the rape testified that her rape-kit physical examination of
the victim was consistent with rape.8 3 The defendant's saliva was found
on the victim's breast, which strongly indicates the defendant had
84
sexual contact with the victim.
It is possible that the jury did not believe that sex occurred. Instead
of the defendant's saliva getting on the victim's breast during a sex act,
possibly the defendant spit on the victim and it landed on her breast.
78.

YOUNG LAWYER'S SECTION, BAR ASS'N OF THE DIST. OF COLUMBIA, CRIMINAL JURY

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DIST. OF COLUMBIA, § 2.09 (4th ed. 1993) [hereinafter D.C. JURY
INSTRUCTIONS] (reasonable doubt).
79.

COMMITTEE ON CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL

JURY INSTRUCTIONS, § 2.90 (West, 7th ed. 2003) (presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt,
burden of proof).
80. D.C. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 78, § 2.09 (reasonable doubt).
81. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-13(a) (2006).
The accused commits criminal sexual assault if he or she: (1) commits an act of sexual
penetration by the use of force or threat of force; or (2) commits an act of sexual
penetration and the accused knew that the victim was unable to understand the nature
of the act or was unable to give knowing consent ....
Id.
82. Roane, supra note 44.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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But that is not what the juror commented. There was no comment about
the proof of sex being insufficient to convict. Alternatively, perhaps the
jury was not convinced regarding consent. But, if the jury was
concerned regarding the victim's consent, particular dirt in the cervix
does not relate to that concern. Matching dirt relates to the location of
the crime scene. Possibly the jury thought the victim was lying as to the
location of the sex and actually had consensual sex with the defendant
at another location without dirt. As one can see from this exercise,
trying to extrapolate what the jury could have thought, maybe thought,
did or did not think, is endless. We do know what the juror said
influenced the verdict-lack of forensic testing of the dirt inside the
victim which, as a legal matter, is not tied to any materiality in the case.
However, on a television show, scientifically analyzing the dirt would
be a very glitzy and high tech issue for entertainment value,
notwithstanding its minuscule legal relevance or probative value
regarding the rape charge.
This case stands out as an example of the CSI Effect because it is
believed to exhibit a glimpse into the insatiable appetite modern jurors
have for forensic proof, even when the results of the forensic test appear
irrelevant to the material elements in question. The juror comment in
the Peoria rape case implies a heightened expectation for exhaustive
forensic testing that prosecutors fear. This fear drives the CSI Infection
throughout the various phases of the trial. Litigants on each side are
now vigilantly guessing at how the CSI Infected Juror will receive the
real case evidence as well as what unanswered questions they might
have due to their exposure to the fictional version of criminal
investigations and prosecutions. 85 Although it might sound extreme,
after Peoria and other cases like it, some trial lawyers began to seek
judicial intervention.
The Peoria case stands as an example of a tainted jury, tainted by the
CSI Effect that allegedly blurs a juror's ability to understand the
realities of crimes, crime scene investigations, and true evidence. A CSI
Infected Juror is perceived to fixate on the presence or absence of
certain forensic proof to the exclusion of all other evidence and make
factual findings which appear unreasonable and unexplainable. The
acquittal in the Peoria case exemplifies the insatiable appetite CSI
Infected Jurors have for "complex scientific proof," and demonstrates
how jurors will disregard testimony from witnesses and law

85. Thomas, supra note 39. "[I1n about 40% of the [Maricopa County] prosecutors' cases,
jurors have asked questions about evidence like 'mitochondrial DNA,' 'latent prints,' 'trace
evidence,' or 'ballistics'-even when these terms were not used at trial." Id. at 70.
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enforcement officers when their appetite is not satisfied. 86 There seems
to be almost no logical limit to the amount of proof a CSI Infected jury
will demand, notwithstanding normal inferences of guilt or innocence.
This phenomenon poses a danger to society because it allows, for
example, rapists to walk away free from punishment and to rape
again. 87 In this environment, criminals are not acquitted because of
insufficient evidence to convict them; rather, they are acquitted because
the evidence did not satisfy the jurors' need for over-exhaustive forensic
88
tests like those fictitiously done on television.
The Peoria case is just one of many criminal cases where the CSI
Infection has been in action and operating to skew jurors' perceptions of
proof. 89 Even before the first witness is sworn in, or the first exhibit is
marked, many jurors likely have preconceived judgments about what
type of evidence a "good" criminal prosecution should include. It is a
modern reality that jurors have opinions about law and science,
especially regarding how scientific evidence relates to criminal justice.
Such preconceptions are inevitable due to the average juror's exposure
to television depictions of crime scenes, crime scene investigations and
criminal prosecutions. 90 These depictions are replete with impeccably
choreographed, Hollywood-style plot development, and romantically
handsome leading men who deliver star-powered acting and convey the
86.
87.

Sherri M. Owens, The CSI Effect, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 27, 2005, at BI.
See Roane, supra note 44.
Defense attorneys, predictably, are capitalizing on the popularity of shows like CSI,
seizing on an absence of forensic evidence, even in cases where there's no apparent
reason for its use. In another Peoria case, jurors acquitted a man accused of stabbing
his estranged girlfriend because police didn't test her bloody bedsheets for DNA. This
man went back to prison on a parole violation and stabbed his ex again when he got
out-this time fatally.

Id.
88. See Karin H. Cather, The CSI Effect: Fake T.V. and It's Impact on Jurors in Criminal
Cases, 38 APR PROSECUTOR 9, 12 (2004).
Abbe Rifkin, a long-time prosecutor with the Miami State Attorney's Office, observes:
"These shows have had a tremendous deleterious effect on criminal trials and
prosecutions, because jurors expect us to be able to do a lot more forensically than
we're really able to do. As such, they've almost raised our burden of proof from
'beyond and to the exclusion of every reasonable' to 'scientifically, no doubt at all."'
Id.
89. See Clayton M. Robinson, Jr., The CSI Effect on Sexual Assault Prosecutions, SEXUAL
VIOLENCE JUST. INST. SMART SOURCE, Nov./Dec. 2005, at 1, 1-2, available at
http://www.mncasa.org/documents/November%202005.pdf.
90. The American viewing audience (i.e., the jury pool) is hooked: among the twenty most
popular prime-time shows, criminal justice dramas represented over one-quarter of the
programming during the 2008-2009 season. See Nielsen Ratings, supra note 2 (ranking NCIS
fifth, CSI sixth, The Mentalist eighth, Criminal Minds twelfth, CSI: Miami thirteenth, CSI: NY
nineteenth).
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drama of each scene. Our modem jury pool is overwhelmed by
91
television shows that do not reflect real justice or investigation at all;
instead, such fictional depictions may in fact be creating injustice for
the victims of crime and undermining the public's safety.
Crime scene images, evidence, and lab reports analyzing the critical
evidence necessary to solve the case bombard potential jurors. 92 Every
"television-land cold-case" is solved with uncanny precision; it is a
recurring scenario observed so often on television and film that it almost
seems real. In other words, the idea that all crimes are solvable
becomes real,9 3 as does the concept that evidence is always perfectly
linear and conclusive to only one explanation-the guilt of the accused.
Further, it also begins to seem real that sophisticated forensic evidence
is always found if a thorough investigation is conducted, and, therefore,
inversely implies to the frequent viewer that the lack of such dispositive
94
evidence indicates sloppy police work or weak prosecutorial evidence.
Although the lay jury pool may become educated about, or even
fascinated with, 9 5 criminal justice by watching these CSI-type shows,
their newly gained knowledge is often false, unrealistic, and
misapplied. 96
Jurors' erroneous, yet rigid, beliefs about crimes,
criminal investigations, and criminal evidence, whether consciously or
unconsciously obtained, can lead to both false acquittals and wrongful
97
convictions in some of the most serious cases of rape and murder.
91. See Nielsen Ratings, supra note 2 (ranking NCIS fifth, CSI sixth, The Mentalist eighth,
Criminal Minds twelfth, CSI: Miami thirteenth, CSI:NY nineteenth).
92. Papke, supra note 47, at 1228 (acknowledging the social science research of the
cultivation effect and noting that "the overall presence and power of popular culture should not be
minimized").
93. Id.
94. See United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 355-56 (5th Cir. 2007) (ruling the balancing
test of prejudice versus probative value under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 is swayed due to the
CSI Effect that heightens juror expectation for an explanation or forensic evidence); see also Old
Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 188-89 (1997) (noting that the prosecution must generally
be allowed to present its case free from a defendant's option to stipulate because jurors may hold
it against prosecutors when they are not fully satisfied by the manner in which evidence is
presented).
95. See Mardis, supra note 5, at 12; see also Willing, supra note 42 (noting that CSI-type
television programs have helped to draw more students into forensic studies).
96. See Roane, supra note 44.
97. See, e.g., Morrison, supra note 44, at 1 (reporting the perceived CSI Effect in the Las
Vegas Binion murder case); see also Findley, supra note 21; Andrew Blankstein & Jean Guccino,
'CSI' Effect or Just Flimsy Evidence? The Jury is Out, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2005, at AI,
available at http://articles.latimes.corn2005/mar/18/local/me-jurorsl8?pg=l
(discussing the
perceived CS! Effect on the Robert Blake murder case in California and noting that some jurors
acknowledged that television crime shows created for them a "higher expectation" of proof);
Willing, supra note 42 (discussing the Robert Durst case from Texas and the Durst defense
strategy of selecting CSI Infected Jurors).
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III. THE CSI INFECTION INACTION WITHIN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM

Quelling ill effects of the CS! Infection within criminal litigation is
the ultimate goal of this research. This Part examines the relevant
arguments of litigants as well as rulings by courts on these issues. The
stages of the trial that are particularly relevant to the CSI Infection
discussion include: jury selection, opening statement, closing argument,
admission of scientific forensic tests and corresponding expert witness
testimony, and jury instructions. Litigants' perceived fears of CSI
Infected Jurors can be minimized by: (1) targeting voir dire questions to
identify biased jurors and eliminate them from the panel; (2) structuring
the litigant's case-in-chief specifically to combat improper inferences
by the jury and misconceptions regarding the presence or absence of
forensic evidence; (3) utilizing opening statements and closing
arguments as the opportunity to minimize any impact from the CSI
Infection; and (4) drafting special jury instructions that direct jurors to
use only the standards articulated by the court to weigh the evidence,
not standards learned from television or other sources outside the
courtroom.
The following will discuss how judges adjudicate the evidentiary,
procedural, and constitutional issues surrounding the CSI Effect.
A. Identification and Analysis of the CSI Infection in Each Phase of
Trial
In the discussion and analysis of the CSI Infection, one must be
mindful of the adversarial system in which these issues exist. Litigants
on both sides of a criminal case are faced with diverging concerns about
the fear of CSI Infected Jurors and how they may react throughout the
trial to the evidence in the case. Prosecutors may worry that jurors will
have unrealistic expectations of proof and that jurors will misinterpret
the forensic evidence because of their exposure to fictional versions of
crime scene investigations and prosecutions. 9 8 The defense may predict
that CSI Infected Jurors will reject some of the prosecution's low-tech
evidence and use that as an opportunity by attempting to trigger jurors'
pop culture references and misconceptions in cross-examination
questions and closing arguments to gain an acquittal. 9 9 Criminal
98. See Kate Coscarelli, The 'CSI' Effect, STAR-LEDGER, Apr. 18, 2005, at ].
99. See State v. Swope, 762 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008), review denied, 765
N.W.2d 578 (Wis. 2009) (providing an example of the defense tactic of triggering the jury's pop
cultural references instead of focusing on the actual testimony from the expert witness). The
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defense attorneys may also worry that attempts to directly address the
perceived CS! Effect within the jury will improperly lower the
prosecution's burden of proof, thus leading to an unfair guilty
verdict.10 0 While respecting the legitimate value of the litigants'
competing adversarial concerns, the court cannot ignore the issues and
allow a reduction in the government's burden of proof nor allow
litigants to manipulate jurors' vulnerabilities. Instead, the objective is
to enable jurors to independently assess the case without improper
influence stemming from fictional sources outside of the courtroom.
This Article proposes including additional and specific instructions
for the jury regarding the dangers of allowing fictional information to
color the analysis of real case facts. Correctly identifying biased jurors
is nearly impossible. Therefore, all seated jurors must be properly
instructed regarding the dangers of allowing the media, as well as
fictional television, to influence their service as jurors. Although this
Article is primarily concerned with the negative consequences of CSI
Infected Jurors rendering wrongful convictions and false acquittals, one
positive consequence of CSI Infected Jurors may, in fact, be their
overall enthusiasm and interest in criminal investigations. This could
10 1
present added value to the overall litigation process.
The new special jury instruction proposed herein optimizes the
modem juror's increased enthusiasm 10 2 for criminal investigations and
prosecution's expert witness, a death analyst, was asked by the defense, on cross examination, to
compare his work with the FBI to the television show, Quincy, M.E., an NBC television series
running from 1976 to 1983. Id. The expert witness answered:
Yes, it's television and ... it is a problem for law enforcement I think because there is
an expectation by people who watch those shows, things like Criminal Mind. The FBI
profile does not have a Gulf Stream that we fly around in. Contrary to popular opinion
we still fly coach. What they do in television just many times is simply not feasible in
the real world and it-it really takes . . . a critical detailed review of these types of
crimes or these types of death scenes to figure out what is going on, and it is very
tedious, and it is not very glamorous, but that really would not work in a television
show, so I think although it is entertaining, it is simply not reality.
Id. at 729 n.3; see also Willing, supra note 42 (discussing the Robert Durst case as an example
where CSI Infected jurors were successfully targeted by defense attorneys to gain an acquittal).
In Evans v. State, a defense cross-examination of a police officer asking why the officer did not
use audio surveillance to capture the accused's incriminating statements triggered the court to
give the jury Maryland's CSI jury instruction: a curative instruction that there was no legal
requirement that the prosecution use any specific investigative technique or scientific evidence to
prove its case. Evans v. State, 922 A.2d 620, 620 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005).
100. See United States v. Harrington, 204 F. App'x 784, 788 (1 1th Cir. 2006).
101. See Mann, supra note 51, at 214 (asserting that the heightened interest of jurors in
forensic science, due to CSI television shows, is beneficial to the criminal justice system). See
Mark Findlay, Juror Comprehension and the Hard Case-Making Forensic Science Simpler, 36
INT'L J. L. CRIME & JUST. 15 (2008).
102. Another part of the CSI Effect is that the average lay juror is intrigued about criminal
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prosecutions, while minimizing any misinformation gained from
television. 10 3 A juror's expectation for more proof is not necessarily a
bad thing. 10 4 Actually, the opposite is true. Increased scrutiny of the
prosecution's evidence by the jury is important. It is beneficial to the
legitimacy of the criminal justice system. 105 The CSI Infection becomes

problematic when litigators surreptitiously manipulate jurors' analysis
of evidence, in the belief that jurors will improperly use skewed
information gained from fictional entertainment sources. 10 6 Problems

arise when jurors unconsciously use their fictionally-based knowledge
to make specious inferences in real cases. 10 7 This is the point where the
CSI Infection most dangerously threatens justice and must be remedied.

1. Selecting and Instructing the Jury: Voir Dire Questioning
The CSI Infection must be addressed with potential jurors
immediately, before any jurors are selected. Therefore, effective use of
the voir dire process is necessary. 10 8 Voir dire questioning must
law, criminal investigations, and criminal prosecutions because of their increased exposure to
CSI-type fictional television dramas. See Roane, supra note 44.
The whole investigation genre is hot, from NBC's Law & Order series on down to the
documentary-like recreations of A&E's Forensic Files. America is in love with
forensics, from the blood spatter and bone fragments of TV's fictional crime scenes to
the latest thrust and parry at the Michael Jackson trial.
Id.
103. See infra Part III.A.2-3. New CSI Infection instructions are suggested as part of the
standard instructions given at the beginning and throughout the case as well as given at the
conclusion of all the evidence along with the reasonable doubt instruction.
104. Challenging the government's evidence and holding the government to its high burden of
proof is an important and necessary component of the American criminal justice system. There is
no need to remedy instances wherein a jury acquits based on reason.
105. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("[U]se of the
reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the
community in applications of the criminal law.").
106. See Willing, supra note 42. The juror consultant, Robert Hirschhorn, is a perfect
example. Id. Hirschhorn advised Robert Durst's defense attorneys to select jurors who watched
shows like CSI because he believed they would expect the prosecutors to produce forensic
evidence which was beyond what the prosecutors could give them. Id. Durst was accused of
dismembering the body of a person he claimed to have shot in self defense. Id. The head of the
body was never found and the defense emphasized that wounds to the head might have proved
their claim of self defense. Id. The defense gambled that CSI-infected jurors would expect the
prosecution to produce this kind of evidence and the gamble paid off: Durst was acquitted. Id.
107. See, e.g., Morrison, supra note 44; Roane, supra note 44; Willing, supra note 42.
108. See Anne M. Payne & Christine Cohone, Jury Selection & Voir Dire in Criminal Cases,
76 AM. JUR. TRIALS 127, § 1 (2009).
Voir dire plays a critical function in assuring the criminal defendant that his Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury will be honored, as without adequate voir dire
the trial judge's responsibility to remove prospective jurors who will not be able
impartially to follow the court's instructions and evaluate the evidence cannot be
fulfilled.
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initially identify, and then eliminate, biased jurors from the panel. The
procedure for voir dire varies depending upon the jurisdiction, as well
as the customs of the presiding judge. Questions can be asked either by
the litigants or by the judge; 10 9 typically, in federal court, judges ask the
majority of questions, while1 10in state court judges generally allow
litigants to ask most questions.
This Section discusses United States v. Harrington1 1 as an example
of the effective use of voir dire to address the potential CSI Infection of
jurors. In Harrington,the presiding federal district court judge, Marcia
Cooke, asked potential jurors targeted voir dire questions to identify
Harrington objected to the
individual CSI Infected Jurors. Defendant
12
targeted questioning and appealed.
In considering Harrington's objection, one may wonder whether it is
customary for judges to inquire about the television viewing habits of
Although judges maintain wide discretion in
potential jurors.
determining voir dire questions, not all judges seek to identify, and
possibly eliminate, CSI Infected Jurors from the venire. In fact, Judge
Cooke is one of few judges who actively engage in this modem, but

imperative, exercise.

13

Id.
109. Id. §§ 4,5.
110. See id.
Ill. United States v. Harrington, 204 F. App'x 784, 788 (11 th Cir. 2006).
112. Id.
113. One reason Judge Cooke gave as to why she asks voir dire questions regarding the
potential CSI Infection where other judges do not, is because she also was a trial lawyer in the
post-CSI/Law & Order era. Cooke Interview, supra note 48. Prior to her appointment to the
federal bench, as a litigator she encountered the CSI Effect operating within her trial juries. Id.
Judge Cooke says she understands the issue of the CSI-phenomenon and its impact in the
courtroom and finds that it is important to: (1) identify CS! Infected Jurors, and (2) remind all
potential jurors that the case they are about to hear is real life, not television. Id. Although she is
not the only judge that is taking note and taking action regarding the CSI Infection, her
perspective is interesting especially considering her procedure was appealed and affirmed as
appropriate. See also McMahan, supra note 46 (demonstrating that Judge Bass shares Judge
Cooke's concerns); cf MARICOPA COUNTY ATIrYS OFFICE, supra note 25 (demonstrating that
judges in Maricopa County State Court treat prosecutors' concern regarding the CSI Infection
within the jury venire as nonsensical). See Harrington,204 F. App'x at 788-89.
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Not all judges tackle this thorny issue. 1 14 Judge Cooke, therefore, is
not typical, and instead, is unique among her peers."l 5 A 2005 survey
by the Maricopa County Attomey's Office in Arizona found that the
majority of prosecutors in Maricopa County think that state court judges
do not effectively acknowledge the CSI Infection; in fact, some
116
prosecutors feel that judges find the CSI Infection a silly notion.
Even if novel or. innovative, it is perfectly appropriate for judges, sua
sponte, or upon the request of counsel, to ask these types of questions
during jury selection in order to ensure fair and impartial jurors are
impaneled as the triers-of-fact in every criminal case.
[D]istrict courts "have broad discretion in formulating jury
instructions provided that the charge as a whole accurately reflects the
law and the facts,' and [appellate courts] will not reverse a conviction
on the basis of a jury charge unless 'the issues of law were presented
inaccurately, or the charge improperly ' puided
the jury in such a
17
substantial way as'to violate due process."
An interview with Judge Marcia Cooke revealed more insight into
1 18
why she addresses the latent CSI Infection within her courtroom.
Judge Cooke explained that she finds it necessary to query potential
jurors, before they are selected, regarding any CSI Effect biases they
may have because it could impact their decision-making processes.
Judge Cooke asks the following types of questions: (1) can the juror
make the distinction between the fictional cases depicted on the CSItype shows and real cases; (2) can the juror convict even if CSI-type
evidence is not presented; and (3) does the juror understand that some
of the tests and investigation procedures used on television shows may
not even be possible in real life? 1 19 Jurors who indicate that they will
114. Compare Honorable Donald E. Shelton, The 'CSI Effect': Does It Really Exist, NU
JOURNAL No. 259, Mar. 2008, at 6, available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/221501.pdf
("[J]udges should understand, anticipate, and address the fact that jurors enter the courtroom with
a lot of information about the criminal justice system and the availability of scientific evidence.")
and McMahan, supra note 46 (demonstrating that Oklahoma County District Judge Jerry Bass
shares Judge Cooke's concerns) with MARICOPA COUNTY ATr'ys OFFICE, supra note 25, at 9-10
(noting that only nineteen percent of Maricopa County, Arizona prosecutors experienced cases in
which judges communicated with juries about the CSI Effect and one prosecutor said, "Most
judges think it's silly I even address these questions in voir dire").
115. Cooke Interview, supra note 48.
116. See MARICOPA COUNTY A"r'YS OFFICE, supra note 25, at 9-10.
117. United States v. Prather, 205 F.3d 1265, 1270 (1 1th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v.
Arias, 984 F.2d 1139, 1143 (11 th Cir. 1993)).
118. Cooke Interview, supra note 48.
119. Id.; see also Schweitzer & Saks, supra note 4, at 358 ("One forensic scientist estimates
that 40% of the 'science' on CSI does not exist, and most of the rest is performed in ways that
crime lab personnel can only dream about."); CS!: Crime Scene Investigation: $35K O.B.O.,
supra note 53 (discussing an example of a television portrayal of investigative techniques that are
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require a showing of CSI-type evidence in 12order
to convict are
0
appropriate candidates to be dismissed for cause.
In Harrington, the defendant was convicted by jury verdict of
multiple felony drug trafficking charges. 12 1 He contributed to a
marijuana trafficking operation by sailing boats from Jamaica to South
12 2
Florida that contained hidden compartments full of marijuana.
Harrington challenged his conviction by arguing that Judge Cooke
abused her discretion by instructing jurors that they could base their
conviction only on evidence they learned in court. 12 3 Additionally,
Harrington claimed that the instruction allowing jurors to only use "incourt evidence," coupled with Judge Cooke's statement that CSI-type
124
evidence would not be required for a conviction, were erroneous.
not possible in real life).
120. Judge Cooke also accepts excessive viewing of CSI-type shows as a race-neutral reason
to dismiss jurors if there is a peremptory challenge by one of the parties. Cooke Interview, supra
note 48; see also People v. Wells, 850 N.E.2d 637, 642 (N.Y. 2006) (finding that a prosecutor's
use of a peremptory challenge to excuse an African-American female juror who stated she
frequently read mystery novels survived a Batson challenge and the court accepted the
prosecutor's explanation of the CSI Effect as his race neutral reason for striking the juror). But
see United States v. Hendrix, No. 06-CR-0054-C-01, 2006 WL 3488970 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 30,
2006), aff'd, 509 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 2007). In Hendrix, the Defendant appealed for a new trial
alleging that the trial judge erred "in finding that the government had made a race-neutral
showing for its striking of the only two African-Americans on the jury panel .... Hendrix,
2006 WL 3488970, at *1. The court ruled that there was no timely Batson objection to the
striking of these jurors and further accepted the government's race-neutral reason being that both
African-American jurors had a close relative in prison on a felony charge. Id. However, in
significant dicta, the Hendrix court went on to say:
I agree with [the] defendant that watching CSI is not a valid reason by itself for striking
prospective juror Woodland when many other panelists had reported watching the
same show. However, it gave [the prosecutor's] decision a modest amount of added
heft in combination with the fact that [juror] Woodland has a relative in prison,
particularly when the case was one in which there was no scientific evidence to prove
the defendant's possession of the firearm. (It is possible that because shows such as
CS1 rely heavily on scientific evidence in solving crimes, jurors that watch these shows
expect the government to produce similar evidence in any criminal case.)
Id. at *5; Tyler, supra note 1; see also Schweitzer & Saks supra note 4.
121. United States v. Harrington, 204 F. App'x 784, 786 (1lth Cir. 2006).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 788. Judge Cooke did not give the jurors a direct CS! instruction during voir dire,
nor at the beginning or close of the evidence. Id. Instead she questioned potential jurors about
their understanding of the difference between television depictions of criminal investigations and
the real life version of criminal investigations and prosecutions. Id. at 789. Giving a CSI jury
instruction at the close of evidence was done, however, in State v. Evans, which is discussed
below. See infra III.A.3.
124. Harrington,204 F. App'x at 899; see also Evans v. State, 922 A.2d 620, 627 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2005) (instructing jurors via curative jury instruction that the government is not
required to utilize specific investigative techniques or scientific tests). The curative CS!
instruction in Evans was given in response to the defense argument that the police had not used
all the investigative equipment available because the investigating detective did not use audio and
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Harrington asserted that Judge Cooke's voir dire lessened the
government's burden of proof and undermined the court's later
reasonable doubt instruction.
Harrington's argument raised due process concerns over lowering the
government's burden of proof.12 5 The argument echoed the sentiment
of every defense attorney whenever there is an attempt by the
government or a judge to query the venire in voir dire, or even to
caution a seated panel of jurors in either opening statement or closing
argument about the dangers of imposing television standards on real
cases. 126 However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit rejected Harrington's challenge of Judge Cooke's jury selection
procedure:
Here, we conclude from the record that the district court did not abuse
its discretion by telling the jury venire that it could only convict
Harrington based on evidence presented in court. The district court's
use of the word "convict" was a matter of phrasing and did not change
the burden of proof. Additionally, the district court did not err by
questioning jurors about whether they would be able to separate
television shows from the facts of the case and stating that there may
not be "CSI" evidence presented to them. The district court's
statements were not actual instructions and did not inaccurately reflect
the law. Further, the district court instructed the paneled jury, before
opening arguments [sic], on the applicable burden of proof, and the
jury is presumed to have followed
this instruction. Thus, the district
12 7
court did not abuse its discretion.
The Eleventh Circuit's ruling in Harringtonappears to be a logical
and correct result.1 28 What could be more appropriate than the trial
judge instructing her jurors to consider only admissible evidence
learned in court when determining guilt or innocence in a criminal case?
It is important to query potential jurors about their ability to focus on

visual surveillance equipment during the controlled drug transactions which would have
corroborated the detective's testimony. Id. Evans' conviction was affirmed on appeal. Id.
125. Prosecutors and judges may not seek to lower the state's burden of proof in a criminal
case. See State v. Cooke, 914 A.2d 1078, 1088 (Del. Super. Ct. 2007) (highlighting that one must
be careful not to denigrate, disparage, or minimize the burden of proof in a criminal case).
126. See Harrington, 204 F. App'x at 784 (challenging the judge's voir dire questioning as
lowering the government's burden of proof); Mathis v. State, No. 25, 2006, 2006 WL 2434741
(Del. Aug. 21, 2006), affd, 968 A.3d 492 (Del. 2009) (challenging prosecutor's opening
statement as lowering the government's burden of proof); Boatswain v. State, No. 408, 2004,
2005 WL 1000565 (Del. Apr. 27, 2005), affd, 962 A.2d 256 (Del. 2008) (challenging
prosecutor's closing argument as disparaging the government's burden of proof); Evans, 922
A.2d at 620 (challenging the jury instructions are lowering the government's burden of proof).
127. Harrington,204 F. App'x at 789.
128. Id.
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reality and distinguish fiction. It is the judge's duty to make sure that
jurors rely only on admissible evidence in their deliberations, and not on
knowledge learned from television, newspapers,
independent
12 9
investigations, or other unauthorized sources.
However, the appellate arguments that challenged the use of targeted
questions to eliminate the CSI Infection seem to presuppose that it is
appropriate for jurors to consider evidence learned outside the
courtroom. 130 Yet, if jurors were permitted by the judge to consider
evidence learned outside of court, the defense would object on due
process grounds, and rightly so. 13 1 When jurors in deliberation on a
criminal case are allowed to consider evidence obtained from unknown
sources, unrestrained by the evidentiary and constitutional strictures of
the American criminal justice system, the fairness of the trial
proceeding is completely compromised. 132 Warning jurors against this
danger, and questioning a juror regarding his or her ability to conform
to this requirement is necessary and appropriate.
Appellate courts have also reviewed the appropriateness of the
prosecutor, instead of the judge, questioning prospective jurors about
their television-viewing habits. In a recent capital murder case, Goff v.
State, 133 the prosecutor asked whether the potential jurors could
separate what they see on television from what they see in the
courtroom. 134 The prosecutor also asked the potential jurors if they
could keep an open mind about the case and "listen to the evidence and
not speculate because they don't have, say, DNA or they don't have
fingerprints and things you may see or hear about on CSI? Can
' 135
everyone tell me they can do that? Yeah?"
The prosecutor again reminded the jurors of the question posed during
voir dire. In closing argument, the prosecutor stated: "[Y]ou were
asked in voir dire, you all know about CSI. Can you set that aside if
it's not needed and return a verdict, and you all said yes. So we ask
you to hold to that. It's not136
necessary here, and it's not needed. The
evidence is overwhelming."'
129. See infra Part II.A.2; see also infra note 166 and accompanying text.
130. Harrington,204 F. App'x at 788.
131. Letters to the Editor, When JurorsSeek Evidence Online, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2009, at
A20 [hereinafter Seek Evidence Online].
132. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (holding that
in a criminal case the only testimonial evidence the jury is allowed to consider is evidence that the
defendant has had the opportunity to cross-examine).
133. Goffv. State, 14 So. 3d 625 (Miss. 2009).
134. Id.at652-53.
i35. Id.
136. Id.
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Thus, in closing argument the prosecutor urged the jury that DNA
testing was "not necessary" and "not needed" to convict the accused,
Mr. Goff.
In Goff, the facts of the crime were very gruesome.' 3 7 The female
victim, Brandy, was stabbed to death, her organs ripped out of her body
through a hole in her chest allegedly by her boyfriend, Joseph Goff, and
the crime scene and the body were set on fire. 13 8 Notwithstanding the
bloody crime scene and the fact that items retrieved from the murder
scene and from Goff's car contained blood and tissue, DNA testing was
not performed on any of the evidence. 139 Furthermore, the testing that
14 0
was conducted did not identify the source of the blood.
Brandy had left her husband and child to be with Joseph Goff, her
new boyfriend. 14 1 Brandy and Goff were staying at a motel, but she
became scared of Goff and called her husband to help her. 142 Her
husband had arranged to come get her the next morning. 143 However,
by the next morning she was dead. 144
Goff gave a Mirandized statement stating that when he left the motel
room Brandy was alive, and when he came back she was dead and
mutilated. 14 5 Goff further admitted lying on top of Brandy's body when
he returned and found her murdered. 146 Detective Lambert, who
investigated the case, testified at trial that "the original request for DNA
... was withdrawn once he determined Goff was in the motel room and
that Goff had lain on top of Brandy['s body]." 147 At trial Goff
contended that Brandy's husband killed her. 148
Goff presented
evidence attempting to imply a domestic violence history between
Brandy and her husband as a motive. 14 9 Despite this defense, the jury
150
convicted Goff of murdering Brandy and sentenced him to death.

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See id. at 636-38 (summarizing the facts of the crime).
Id.
Id. at 638-39.
Id.
Id. at 633.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 634.
Id. at 636.
Id.
Id. at 639 n.13.
Id. at 639.
See id. (implying that the history of domestic violence suggested a motive).
Id. at 672.
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Goff presents a different legal question than Harrington. In
Harrington,the CSI Effect issue was neutrally addressed by the court as
a routine matter. Based on the interview with Judge Cooke, she asks all
jurors similar questions, and the voir dire in Harringtonwas not special,
nor tailored toward the impending facts of the case.1 5 1 In Goff, the CSI
Effect issue was raised adversarially, by the prosecutor, with an eye
toward the government's lack of DNA evidence in that case. Moreover,

in Goff, the voir dire questions were followed up with the jury, in an
adversarial manner, during the prosecution's closing argument when the

jurors were asked to remember what they promised in jury selectionthat they would put aside CSI and listen to all the evidence even if there
was no DNA evidence. Goff challenged the prosecutor's voir dire
questioning and closing argument under the theory that the prosecutor
improperly "sought a promise from the jury that they would be able to
convict Goff even in the absence of DNA evidence." 152 At first glance,
it seems like the prosecutor "made a deal" with the jurors that they
would convict Goff without DNA. But upon close inspection of the
prosecutor's language, he did not ask if they could convict without
DNA evidence, he asked if they would listen to the evidence and not
speculate; and further, whether, in the age of CSI, they could listen to all
the evidence and not speculate even in a case that did not have DNA
evidence. 15 3 This type of language is consistent with the wording of the
reasonable doubt standard that forbids speculation. 15 4 Thus, the
155
prosecutor's statements contained a correct statement of the law.
However, when the prosecutor referenced the CSI Effect discussion
again in closing argument, was the prosecutor asking the jurors to fulfill
a promise and convict, or simply to consider all the evidence presented

151. Cooke Interview, supra note 48.
152. Goff, 14 So. 3d at 652-53.
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., supra notes 78-79; see also People v. Williams, 21 P.3d 1209, 1216 (Cal.
2001) (holding that jurors are required to follow the law as instructed by the court). In Curley v.
United States, the Court stated:
The functions of the jury include the determination of the credibility of witnesses, the
weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of justifiable inferences of fact from proven
facts. It is the function of the judge to deny the jury any opportunity to operate beyond
its province. The jury may not be permitted to conjecture merely, or to conclude upon
pure speculation or from passion, prejudice or sympathy.
Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229, 232 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
155. Goff, 14 So. 3d at 652-53; see also Taylor v. State, 672 So.2d 1246, 1264 (Miss. 1996)
(explaining that the prosecutor's questions during voir dire were simply used to gain insight into
the prejudices of the potential jurors rather than to commit them to a verdict).
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in the case-such as Goff's statements and evidence found at the crime
15 6
scene and in Goffs car?
Upon close inspection of the language in a sterile transcript record, it
is clear what the prosecutor asked-he asked for them to consider all
the evidence. The trepidation is still whether it was understood that way
by the jurors during the heat of a live and impassioned closing argument
in court. There is the residual impression that the jurors were asked to
follow up on a promise to convict, yet technically what they promised in
jury selection was actually to keep an open mind. The substance of the
closing argument appropriately highlights that the DNA evidence is not
needed to convict due to the overwhelming nature of the actual evidence
that was presented throughout the trial. 157 On appeal, Goff's conviction
was affirmed and the prosecutor's statements in voir dire and closing
argument were found to be proper. 158 The court rejected Goff' s
159
allegations of error.
As advocates discuss perceived CSI Effect issues with potential
jurors during voir dire, lawyers must be careful not to improperly
influence jurors or extract a promise from them prior to trial. 160 Such a
promise violates due process. 16 1 Jurors cannot be put in a "box" or
make a promise that prevents them from considering all the evidence
relevant to the criminal charges. 16 2 It is reversible error to ask a juror to
commit to returning a particular verdict. 163 Although most state courts
liberally allow the attorneys to conduct voir dire, it is a constitutionally
safer practice to allow the court to perform voir dire regarding the CSI
Effect issues wherein there is no adversarial spin to the questioning nor
any pressure placed on jurors to "come through as promised" for one
side or the other.
The prosecutor in Goff walked a thin, but straight, line with the jury
and did not violate any constitutional or procedural rules. 164 However,
16 5
more importantly, the prosecutor addressed the elephant in the room:
156. Goff, 14 So. 3d at 652-53.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 672.
160. Stringer v. State, 500 So. 2d 928, 938-39 (Miss. 1986) (stating that such a promise
prevents jurors from considering all the factors relevant to a verdict).
161. See id. (explaining that it is reversible error to ask a juror during voir dire to commit to
returning a particular verdict).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 938.
164. Goff, 14So. 3dat652-53.
165. Although rules of procedure often prevent the jury from learning about certain prejudicial
facts, it is also widely suspected that jurors talk about the exact issues that courts instruct them
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the expectation for CSI-type evidence, particularly in a serious murder
case. Since most murder cases on television or film conduct DNA
testing of the blood evidence, discussion of the topic with the jury was
relevant and warranted. Focusing the jury to consider all the evidence is
key to fair deliberations in all cases, but it is particularly imperative in
death penalty cases, which carry the most serious punishment that the
law currently allows.
This Article next addresses whether CSI Effect issues should be
discussed with the jurors before any evidence is heard, after all the
evidence has been received, or both.
2. Instructing Jurors Before Any Evidence
At the beginning of a case, and prior to the admission of any
evidence, jurors receive standard jury instructions. These instructions
remind jurors of their role as fact-finders and caution them about
technical due process concerns in layperson's terms. Jurors are told: (1)
to keep an open mind; (2) not to make conclusions about the case until
all the evidence is heard; (3) not to discuss the case with anyone until
the end of the case; (4) at the end of the case, to only discuss the case
with their fellow impaneled jurors who have taken an oath to be fair and
have heard all admissible evidence (as well as proper cross-examination
of that evidence); (5) not to read any news accounts about the case; and
(6) not to conduct any personal investigation. 166 These instructions are
given at the beginning of a case and typically restated daily when the
court adjourns. 167 Jurors are reminded about their role, oath, duty,
objectivity, and fairness. 168 Human nature makes following some of
these instructions difficult, which is one reason that jurors are
commonly reinstructed on these points multiple times during the case.
Still, some jurors fail to comply fully with these directives, 16 9 and,
depending on the severity of the violation of the court's instruction, it

not to talk about. Therefore, there is value in bringing the issue to the forefront and discussing it
openly for the jury to consider. Further, the case evidence did address why there was no DNAthe request was withdrawn once it was learned that the accused's DNA in the room could not
connect him to the crime because it was his motel room and his admission about lying on the
body. It is still curious that DNA testing was not done to exclude the husband as a suspect,
especially since Goff's defense in part was to point blame at the husband as the likely killer. Id.
166. COMMITTEE ON MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS-FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT §§ 1.9, 2.1 (West
Group 2000) [hereinafter MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS].
167. Id.; see also People v. Williams, 21 P.3d 1209, 1216 (Cal. 2001) (explaining that jurors
are required to follow the law as instructed by the court).
168. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 166.
169. Seek Evidence Online, supra note 131.
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could cause a mistrial. 170 When the fairness of the trial is substantially
to a new trial with a new jury that
compromised, the parties are entitled
17 1
directive.
court's
the
follow
will
Cautioning potentially CSI Infected Jurors earlier and more often
during the case is suggested. An amended standard jury instruction
could be given at this stage of the trial to address potential CSI Effect
issues. The additional language would remind jurors that knowledge
gained from fictional sources, such as television shows, cannot be used
in their assessment of the case. Currently courts give some version of
the following instruction to jurors:
1.3 WHAT IS EVIDENCE
The evidence you are to consider in deciding what the facts are,
consists of:
(1) the sworn testimony of any witness;
(2) the exhibits which are to be received into evidence; and
(3) any facts to which all the lawyers stipulate.
1.4 WHAT IS NOT EVIDENCE
The following things are not evidence, and you must not consider
them as evidence in deciding the facts of this case:
(1) statements and arguments of the attorneys;
(2) questions and objections of the attorneys;
(3) testimony that I instruct you to disregard; and
(4) anything you may see or hear when the court is not in session
even if what you see or hear is done or said by one of the parties or by
one of the witnesses.
In the age of the CSI Infection, an additional fifth bullet could be
added to the standard instruction already entitled "What is not
Evidence." This would highlight that information learned outside the
courtroom from fictional television, movies, and books about criminal
investigations cannot be considered in the jurors' decision-making
process. This fifth point would address the difficulties faced by lay
jurors attempting to differentiate between fact and fiction. The blurring
between fact and fiction is becoming grayer and increasingly difficult
for lay jurors to separate. 172 Although many television shows are based
170. See John Schwartz, As Jurors Turn to Web, MistrialsAre Popping Up, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
18, 2009, at A l.
171. See id. (describing a series of recent cases, both criminal and civil, in various
jurisdictions, wherein juror violations have created varying responses by judges on the question
of mistrial).
172. Papke, supra note 47, at 1231.
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on plots ripped from the headlines, they are not legally accurate
173
depictions of the cases, but rather, sensationalized versions.
Television shows are not bound by the Constitution or rules of
evidence. The general facts depicted can be similar to reality, but the
manner by which those facts are discovered, and the reliability of the
investigative methods used in obtaining them, as well as their
admissibility in court, are stretched and manipulated by producers for
entertainment purposes and better ratings. 174 Due to the widespread
popularity of this type of entertainment, jurors must be cautioned.
An additional reminder can only help. Warning early in the case,
before evidence is heard, poses a lesser threat to unfair prejudice. 175 An
additional remedy, that will be discussed next, considers instructing the
jury about CSI Effect issues after the evidence is heard. 176 However,
instructing early and before the evidence is received is a more neutral
and potentially more effective approach.
One may debate the efficacy of adding another admonishment to the
current standard instructions. However, this Article urges that the
appropriate role of the court is to instruct jurors on how to avoid the
pitfalls of the CSI Infection and any negative impact of pop culture
influences that could skew their findings. Adding this cautionary
instruction fits the needs of the modem criminal jury.
3. Instructing Jurors After All the Evidence
Giving jurors further instruction after all the evidence is heard can be
beneficial too. 177 Arguably, it is insufficient to only give cautionary
instructions at the beginning of trial, during the juror selection process,
or during the daily case adjournments. The final instructions given at
173. Thomas, supra note 39, at 70; see also Richard Catalani, A CSI Writer on the CSI Effect,
115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 76 (2006), http://www.yalelawjoumal.org/images/pdfs/34.pdf.
174. See Nielsen Ratings, supra note 2.
175. Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229, 232 (D.C. Cir, 1947) ("The jury may not be
permitted to conjecture merely, or to conclude upon pure speculation or from passion, prejudice

or sympathy.").
176. See, e.g., Evans v. State, 922 A.2d 620, 628 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007) (illustrating an
example of instructing the jury about these issues after the evidence had been heard); see also
discussion infra Part II.A.3 (discussing the benefit of giving the jury instruction after all the
evidence is heard).
177. In all criminal cases the jury is instructed at the end of all the evidence. The instructions
at the beginning of the case and during the recesses primarily address the procedural issues
regarding the jurors' role as fact-finder. The instructions at the end of the case additionally advise
the jurors regarding the substantive law that applies. For example, the jury is instructed about the
law regarding direct and circumstantial evidence and how to weigh it as a general instruction in
every case, and they are instructed regarding the specific criminal law of the charges, e.g., murder

or robbery.
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the close of the evidence are crucial to a fair and effective deliberation
because it is the last time jurors can be reminded to avoid analyzing the
facts of the case through the lens of fiction.
At the end of the case, immediately prior to deliberations, jurors must
be accurately focused on their task and guided to use only admissible
evidence and information during deliberations. Consistent with the
instructions during voir dire at the beginning of the case, information
gained outside the courtroom, especially from fictional sources, is still
not appropriate information with which to analyze the weighty case
evidence. 17 8 Jurors should again be explicitly instructed regarding this
requirement at the close of the evidence. Although jurors use their own
should
common sense 17 9 in their deliberations, the common sense used
80
be knowingly drawn from reality, not from fiction or fantasy. 1
A special CSI Infection jury instruction should be available and
routinely used for this purpose. This type of special jury instruction can
further train jurors against using improper sources of information for the
purpose of fact-finding and decision-making. Jury instructions have the
potential to blunt the impact of any remaining traces of the jury's CSI
Infection and can reduce the risk of possible erroneous factual analysis,
and correspondingly, wrong verdicts. The research conducted by the
Maricopa County Attorney's Office indicates that eighty-three percent
of prosecutors suggested using special jury instructions for this
purpose. 181
However, the controversy persists regarding the language of any
special jury instruction directed at the perceived CSI Effect. This
Article urges the use of a neutral CSI Infection instruction aimed at
steering jurors away from using fictional information learned outside of
court and instead focusing them solely on the information learned in the
178. See Schweitzer & Saks, supra note 4 (indicating that CSI Infected Jurors tend to use
knowledge gained during excessive viewing of CSI-type programming in the decision-making
process as jurors). Specific instructions to the contrary may change the behavior of the excessive
CSI watchers that Saks discusses. Id.
179. COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT,
PATTERN CRIMINAL FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, § 1.04 (1998),

available at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/pjury.pdf (Weighing the Evidence-Inferences). This
instruction states:
You should use common sense in weighing the evidence and consider the evidence in
light of your own observations in life. In our lives, we often look at one fact and
conclude from it that another fact exists. In law we call this 'inference.' A jury is
allowed to make reasonable inferences. Any inferences you make must be reasonable
and must be based on the evidence in the case.
Id.
180. See Papke, supra note 47 (reducing the cultivation effect of jurors during deliberations).
181. MARICOPA COUNTY ATTY'S OFFICE, supra note 25, at 10.
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courtroom from the admissible evidence. Yet, another type of CSI
Effect instruction is being used in Maryland. In Evans v. State, 18 2 a
case of first impression in Maryland regarding jury instruction aimed at
curbing any perceived CSI Effect, the following special jury instruction
was given:
During this trial, you have heard testimony of witnesses and may hear
argument of counsel that the State did not utilize a specific
investigative technique or scientific test. You may consider these
facts in deciding whether the State has met its burden of proof. You
should consider all of the evidence or lack of evidence in deciding
whether a defendant is guilty. However, I instruct you that there is no
legal requirement that the State utilize any specific investigative
technique or scientific test to prove its case. Your responsibility as
jurors is to determine whether the State has proven, based
on the
183
evidence, the defendants' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The defense in Evans objected to this instruction, arguing that the
court's remedial attempt was too strong and that the instruction, instead,
improperly lowered the government's burden of proof therefore
prejudicing the defendant. 184 On the question of whether to give the
special jury instruction, the trial court determined that the defense's
cross-examination of the testifying investigating detective in the case
triggered the necessity for this curative instruction. 18 5 During trial, the
defense questioned the detective regarding his failure to use video or
audio surveillance during his investigation. 186 This line of questioning
was intended to make the point that electronic surveillance could have
corroborated his testimony. 187 The lack of corroboration was again
brought out by the defense in closing argument. 188 In arguing to the
jury, counsel stressed the lack of the State's evidence to demonstrate a
"cross-check of reliability":
There are very significant facts in this case that create reasonable
doubt that my client and [the other] client were acting in a conspiracy,
in concert to distribute drugs. Now, one factor in this case is whether
or not there are any cross-checks of reliability. Cross-checks of
reliability means that apart from the testimony of one officer who is

182. Evans v. State, 922 A.2d 620 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007).
183. Id. at 628.
184. Id. at 627-28.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 628. "The trial judge was prompted to give the above instruction by the crossexamination of Detective Bradley, which inquired as to specific investigative techniques that
were not used in this case." Id.
188. Id.
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telling you what he claims happened, are there any other cross-checks
of reliability? Well, we know in this case that there is no video of this
event, no surveillance tapes of this event. There were questions asked
of the detective whether that may have been a possibility, could have
broken out a video camera, worn an audio, was it available. I think
that could have been done. It wasn't done here. That would have
been a cross-check of reliability so that besides the testimony of the
detective, you would have something else to cross-check ....
whatever,
...[there is] the lack of any video surveillance evidence,
89
none of that, absolutely none of that exists in this case. 1
...

So how about a videotape or an audiotape? Remember, Detective

Bradley said, "Well, you know, we have the stuff, but my particular
unit didn't have it. We would have to ask the sergeant, or the sergeant
would have to ask somebody else." . . . I[t] strikes me that if you've
got the equipment, you use the equipment. You have a situation where
there are absolutely no scientific tests that implicate my client in any
way. There's no audio. There's no video. There's no fingerprints.
190
There is nothing.

The appellate court in Evans ruled that the trial court's curative jury
instruction correctly informed the jury that the prosecution was not
required to present any specific type of evidence in order to meet its
burden of proof. 19 1 The prosecution was not required to use audio or
video to prove its case; the case could have been proven solely with
eyewitness testimony from the detective. 19 2 The appropriate weight and
credibility to give that eyewitness testimony is up to the jury to
decide. 19 3 Thus, it is legally correct to instruct jurors that prosecutors
are not required to use particular kinds of evidence, even scientific
forensic evidence, to prove their criminal cases. 194 The jury is required,

189. Id. Counsel continued:
Now, I asked a number of questions, because I can't believe that people would get
convicted on a case like this or even charged on a case like this but I asked-and
[appellant's counsel] used the term "cross-checks"-but I asked about certain things
because it makes sense to me that if you're going to convict somebody of felonies, of
serious crimes, you've got to have some evidence.
Id. at 628-29 (emphasis added). According to Maryland Lawyers' rule of Professional Conduct
3.4(e), a lawyer shall not "state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause." MARYLAND
LAWYER'S RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 3.4(e) (2007). Therein co-counsel Peak's
corresponding statement regarding his opinion of the charges during argument was improper.
Evans, 922 A.2d at 628-29 n.6.
190. Id. at 628-29 (emphasis added).
191. Id. at 632-33.
192. Id. at 632.
193. Id. at632-33.
194. Id. at 632.
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instead, to consider the totality of all the evidence introduced
and weigh
19 5
whether the government's burden has been satisfied.
Yet, the Evans case is still curious. The trial court was prompted to
give these CSI Effect jury instructions based on the defense "crossexamination of Detective Bradley, which inquired as to specific
investigative techniques that were not used in this case."' 19 6 However,
the cross-examination of Detective Bradley was proper crossexamination. In other words, there were no objections during the crossexamination. There were no substantive, evidentiary, or procedural
errors during the cross-examination.
Instead, the defense made
legitimate points regarding the investigative methods used and the
corresponding lack of electronic corroborative evidence available due to
the type of investigation Detective Bradley conducted.
It is part of the accused's constitutional right to be able to confront
the evidence presented against him in court. 197 Evans simply exercised

his right by asking Detective Bradley cross-examination questions. Yet,
he was essentially punished for effective advocacy by triggering a
curative instruction. Curative instructions, as the name implies, are only
given when there is error. 19 8 Hence they are a device to cure error or
unfair prejudice. 199 Although the trial court claimed the crossexamination triggered the curative CSI Effect instruction given, there
was no error in the cross-examination. 20 0 Procedurally, the Evans court
was wrong to give a curative instruction in this circumstance.
Substantively, the court's curative instruction is also troubling. Since
the burden of proof in a criminal case is on the prosecution, 20 1 the
defense is not required to present any evidence. 20 2 Additionally, for
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 632-33.
Id. at 628.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
See JACOB STEIN, CLOSING ARGUMENTS § 1:105 (2d ed. 2009).

201.

COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT,

Id.
See Evans, 922 A.2d at 628,

supra note 179, § 2.03. Instruction 2.03 reads as follows:
2.03 PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE - BURDEN OF PROOF: The defendant is
presumed to be innocent of [each of] the charge[s]. This presumption continues during
every stage of the trial and your deliberations on the verdict. It is not overcome unless
from all the evidence in the case you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty as charged. The government has the burden of proving the guilt of
the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden of proof stays with the
government throughout the case. The defendant is never required to prove his
innocence or to produce any evidence at all.
Id.
202. Id.
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many defendants, their primary defense strategy is challenging the
government's evidence via rigorous cross-examination of the
20 3
government's witnesses. This is a legitimate and proper strategy.
The Sixth Amendment further guarantees the accused this right.20 4
However, if exercise of this right triggers an adverse curative

instruction, the instruction improperly welcomes the jury to infer that
the substance of the defense's cross-examination is not legitimate or
important. Therein the defendant is unfairly prejudiced, and the
prosecution's evidence is improperly endorsed. Both consequences are

constitutionally invalid.
In addition, an Evans-type instruction may mislead jurors into

thinking a lower amount of proof is required for conviction. Defendant
Evans claimed the judge's curative instruction was improper exactly for
that reason. 20 5 Yet, the appellate court rejected the argument and
affirmed the Evans conviction. 20 6 In a subsequent case in Maryland,
20 7
this same Evans-type instruction was requested by the prosecution.
However, the legal question in Johnson v. Maryland was slightly
different. In Johnson, although the Evans-instruction was requested by

the prosecution, ultimately it was not given.

Therefore,

the

constitutional issue was not whether the jury was potentially instructed
regarding a lower standard of proof, but instead, whether the threat of
an Evans-type instruction chilled the accused's constitutional right to
20 8
rigorously confront the evidence.
In Johnson, the defendant was charged with possession of a
firearm. 20 9 A central contention of the defense was the lack of evidence
regarding the defendant's fingerprints on the gun. 2 10 The prosecution
203. See Sample v. State, 550 A.2d 661, 663 (Md. 1988) (stating that when the prosecution
fails to use a well-known, readily available, and superior method of proof linking defendant to the
crime, the defendant should be able to comment on this lack of evidence); Eley v. State, 419 A.2d
384, 387 (Md. 1980) ("It is the State which has the burden of producing evidence sufficient to
convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.").
204. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
205. See Evans, 922 A.2d at 627-28 (explaining appellant's argument that "the net effect of
advising the jury that the State has no obligation to produce evidence.. relieved the State, in the
minds of the jurors, of the burden to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt").
206. Id. at 633.
207. Brief of Appellant at *32-34, Johnson v. Maryland, 2009 WL 1348753 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. Apr. 7, 2009) (No. 1687).
208. See Brief of Appellant, supra note 207, at *33-34 (arguing that the judge's decision to
withhold the instruction "chilled" the defense's right to attack the weaknesses of the prosecution's
evidence).
209. Id. at *21 n.5.
210. See id. at *35 (arguing that the evidence was insufficient as the arresting officer never
saw the appellant holding a gun).
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requested an Evans-type CSI Effect instruction to be given at the close
of evidence, essentially instructing the jury that the prosecution was not
required to present fingerprint evidence. 2 11 The trial judge did not grant
the prosecution's request at that time, but instead ruled that the
prosecution's request could be renewed after the defense attorney's
closing argument and the judge would decide whether or not the Evansinstruction was necessary. 2 12 The following discussion regarding the
jury instructions was made on the record:
THE COURT: Additions, exceptions [to the jury instructions]
MS. LIPSCOMB [Prosecution]: Hopefully, I just didn't miss it.
Did you give your scientific evidence [CSI Effect instruction]?
THE COURT: Not yet.
MS. LIPSCOMB [Prosecution]: Okay.
THE COURT: I will give [CSI Effect instruction] depending on the

argument. If the [defense] argument is made that [the government]
didn't do this test and [the government] didn't do that test, then I will
give the scientific evidence instruction [CSI Effect instruction]at that
time.

2 13

Following the defense's closing argument, the prosecution did not
renew its request for the Evans-instruction, and ultimately, no special
instruction was given. Johnson was convicted and appealed, claiming
his constitutional right to a fair trial and his opportunity to wage a full
defense were chilled by the Evans-instruction being held in abeyance,
2 14
contingent upon the substance of the defense's closing argument.
Therefore, there is a related concern, not just in cases where an Evanstype instruction is actually given to the jury, but also in cases where the
instruction is even a possibility following the defense's closing
argument.
4. Substance and Timing of the Instructions Given to the Jury
Evans and Johnson are compelling cases to analyze. The outcome in
Evans may be palatable because in a simple drug case, high-tech audio
and visual surveillance does not appear necessary or essential to
establish the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly in light of
the available direct testimony in the case. 2 15 However, in a gun
possession case like Johnson, the fingerprint evidence is more relevant,
211. Id. at *33.
212. Id.
213. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Transcript of Record at Vol. 3, 39-40, Johnson v.
Maryland, 2009 WL 1348753 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 7, 2009) (No. 1687)).
214. Brief for the Appellant, supra note 207, at *34.
215. Evans v. State, 922 A.2d 620, 628 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007).
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although still not essential. But, consider the possibility of other more
complex cases wherein the proof is highly technical as well as
circumstantial.
Could an Evans-type curative instruction survive
scrutiny in highly contested cases built on circumstantial evidence?
Could an Evans-type curative instruction survive a constitutional
challenge in a case like Goff,2 16 a death penalty case wherein the blood
evidence was never tested for DNA? Further, consider that in Goff the
defense included the defendant's assertion that the victim's husband
was the killer and that DNA testing, if done, could have excluded the
husband. Without the DNA testing being conducted in Goff, the
defense would have a legitimate argument that some doubt as to the
identity of the killer still remained. It would be up to the jury to
determine whether that doubt was truly reasonable doubt. From this
example, one can see how an Evans-type instruction may improperly
taint the jury against the legitimacy of the defense argument in the most
2 17
serious of cases, a murder charge based on circumstantial evidence.
As the seriousness and complexity of the case facts change, the
potential risk for unfair prejudice against the accused becomes more
apparent.
The Maryland method in the form of the Evans-type
instruction is not optimal. While it contains a correct statement of the
law, that is not the full extent of the inquiry. One must also consider
whether the Evans-type instruction adequately guides the jury not to
violate due process. 2 18 Therefore, analysis of the timing, and not just
the substance, of the instruction is necessary to determine whether due
process was violated. The likelihood of unfair prejudice to the defense
depends largely on the phase of the trial in which an Evans-type
instruction is given. 2 19 It could prejudice a legitimately waged defense
2 20
by the accused challenging the sufficiency of the government's proof.
In Evans, the instruction was given immediately after the defendant's
closing argument-prior to the state's rebuttal.2 2 1 One view is that this
timing was best to limit the defendant's ability to manipulate the CSI
Infection and mislead the jury into using an improper analysis. 2 22 Yet,
216. Goff, 14So. 3dat625.
217. Id.at 663.
218. United States v. Prather, 205 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11 th Cir. 2000).
219. See Brief for the Appellee at 25-27, Johnson v. Maryland, 2009 WL 1865879 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. May 15, 2009) (No. 1687) (arguing for defendant that even the threat that an Evanstype instruction could be given chilled the defense's ability to vigorously advocate its case during
closing argument). Cf Evans, 922 A.2d at 628-29 (outlining defense's argument that the
instruction given after the defense's closing argument was unfair).
220. See also supra Part III.A.3.
221. Evans, 922 A.2d at 629.
222. See Willing, supra note 42 (discussing the jury selection strategy in the Robert Durst
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a defendant's closing argument will inevitably attack perceived
weaknesses in the government's proof and question why more evidence,
of whatever kind, was not produced. Permitting judges to instruct jurors
regarding evidence that the prosecution is not required to produce
should accompany general instructions and should not be singled out
and highlighted following the defendant's one opportunity to argue
against the weight of the evidence. The court in Evans walked a fine
line between acting as the gatekeeper for fairness and becoming the
second prosecutor in the courtroom.
In Harrington,the discussion by the court with potential jurors about
not requiring CSI-type evidence came in the beginning of the case. It
was done in a neutral manner and not in reference to particular facts the
jury had already heard, or to defense cross-examination, or to argument
about the lack of scientific testing. Similarly, in Goff, the prosecutor's
discussion with potential jurors, asking them to consider all the
evidence even when there is no DNA evidence, was done in advance of
any evidence being admitted, or jurors hearing cross-examination
regarding why the DNA testing was not done. In an effort to best
preserve an accused's constitutional right to fairly challenge the
evidence, it is preferred to caution jurors early in the case. An unbiased
and early cautionary instruction in the context of the other general
instruction that does not reference or comment upon either the defense's
or the prosecution's case should be most acceptable. It is a neutral and
constitutionally sound approach to instruct jurors regarding how to
temper their exposure to false information about criminal law, criminal
investigations, and criminal prosecutions. In that way, the instruction
cannot be perceived as discrediting a legitimate defense challenge to the
sufficiency of the government's proof.22 3 Although proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is required in every criminal case, there is no
requirement regarding the type of evidence the prosecutor must utilize
to prove the case. Thus, specific investigative techniques or forensic
tests are not required. However, the reality of modem trials is that
jurors will expect such techniques or tests. Once jurors learn that such
tests were possible but not done, the benefit shifts to the defense and
some doubt regarding the evidence is raised in the minds of many

case). See generally United States v. Saldarriaga, 204 F.3d 50, 52 (2d Cir. 2000) (considering the
effect of a judge's instruction regarding which evidence the prosecution presented at the trial).
223. See Evans, 922 A.2d at 628-29. Evans may have limited application because the judge
gave the CSI Effect instruction only to respond to the defense's closing argument. Id. The court
recognized the defense's argument as an improper attempt to distract the jury from the applicable
legal standard. Id.

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 41

jurors. 224 Although it is important for the court to be mindful of, and to
aggressively curb, the CSI Infection's impact upon the verdict, 225 one
must still consider whether the Evans-type instruction goes too far.
There is potential prejudicial impact to criminal defendants who
legitimately illuminate a lack of evidence or sloppy investigative
techniques if a court inserts a curative instruction that, in practical
effect, bolsters the government's case. 22 6 This is precisely why the
Evans instruction walks a very thin curative line.
Thus far, defense attorneys challenge all attempts to direct the jury
away from fanciful television standards and back to reality as an
improper attempt to lower the government's burden. Nonetheless, a
middle ground can be found. Instead of instructing the jury regarding
what techniques the government is not required to use in order to prove
its case, special jury instructions should focus on instructing jurors how
to properly weigh evidence and highlight the consideration of the
totality of the evidence. This includes how to weigh non-scientific
evidence when either side presents it. 227 In other words, although the
weight of the evidence is determined by the jury, scientific evidence is
2 28
not automatically given more weight over non-scientific evidence.
224. See generally supra Part II.B (discussing Peoria rape case wherein jurors' doubt based
on the lack of forensic testing of the victim's cervix for dirt was misplaced vis-A-vis the material
elements of the charge).
225. See Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229, 232 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (explaining that it is the
province of the court to set the parameters of the jury's determination).
226. Evans, 922 A.2d at 628.
227. See, e.g., COMMITrEE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT, supra note 179, § 1.05. These instructions state the following regarding the weight of
direct and circumstantial evidence:
1.05 DEFINITION OF "DIRECT" AND "CIRCUMSTANTIAL" EVIDENCE: Some
of you have heard the phrases "circumstantial evidence" and "direct evidence." Direct
evidence is the testimony of someone who claims to have personal knowledge of the
commission of the crime which has been charged, such as an eyewitness.
Circumstantial evidence is the proof of a series of facts which tend to show whether the
defendant is guilty or not guilty. The law makes no distinction between the weight to
be given either direct or circumstantial evidence. You should decide how much weight
to give to any evidence. All the evidence in the case, including the circumstantial
evidence, should be considered by you in reaching your verdict.
Id. Instructions similar to the circumstantial and direct evidence instructions should be devised to
combat the modem juror's bias against non-scientific evidence. Notably, the lack of scientific
evidence can also be used to disadvantage the defendant. The jury needs to know that just
because the defense did not present DNA to confirm innocence does not mean the defendant is
factually guilty.
228. This is similar to the instruction regarding expert and lay witnesses, where the jury must
determine what weight to give to the witness. See, e.g., id. § 3.07 (Weighing Expert Testimony).
The expert testimony sample instruction reads as follows:
You have heard a witness [witnesses] give opinions about matters requiring special
knowledge or skill. You should judge this testimony in the same way that you judge
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The proposed instruction suggested in this Article is one focused on
the sources of CSI Infection that originate outside of the courtroomtelevision, media, films, books, and the like. An instruction not to use
outside standards, like those used in forensic crime television shows,
when making judgments about guilt or innocence inside the courtroom
more appropriately balances the mutual interests of the litigants. The
secondary goal is to remind jurors to apply only the legal standard as
instructed by the judge, i.e., the burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, not some fictional standard of proof.
B. Litigants Speak Directly to a CSI Infected Juty
Opening statements and closing arguments both present an
opportunity for litigants to directly address the jury; that is, the
impaneled jurors that survived the voir dire screening process. 2 29 Not
every voir dire process will effectively address the CSI Infection of the
venire. 230 Even if dealing with CSI Infection is a goal of voir dire, not
every infected juror is noticed, nor is every infected juror excused from
service. Thus, even in the rare case of a voir dire that addresses the CSI
Infection within the jury, infected jurors will remain. Therefore, parties
should be given the opportunity to address the CSI Infection throughout
23 1
litigation, not just during voir dire or jury instructions.
Prosecutors have attempted to do this with mixed success. In Mathis
v. State, during opening statement, the prosecutor reminded the jury of
the following: "Now keep in mind you're listening to the testimony
from the witness stand. It's not CSI: Miami, it's not Law and Order.
Nobody involved in the case, no one in the room is an actor. These are

the testimony of any other witness. The fact that such a person has given an opinion
does not mean that you are required to accept it. Give the testimony whatever weight
you think it deserves, considering the reasons given for the opinion, the witness'
qualifications, and all of the other evidence in the case.
Id.
229. See MARICOPA COUNTY ATr'YS OFFICE, supra note 25, at 3.
230. In state courts, the litigants are typically allowed to ask the jurors questions with latitude.
See Sanders v. State, 707 So. 2d 664, 668 (Fla. 1998). Even still, the litigants may not be allowed
to ask all their desired questions of the potential jury panel. Id. In federal court, the voir dire is
primarily done by the judge. Dennis G. Terez, Who Said Voir Dire Wasn't Important?,
CHAMPION
MAG.,
April
2006,
at
56,
available
at
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/0/549658461382a9a88525716300527c65?OpenDocument.
It is
within the trial judge's discretion which questions are asked, and some judges are not willing to
delve into the issue of the CSI Effect with the jury. See generally Posting of Robert W. Kelley to
The Florida Jury Selection Blog, The Role of the Judge, http://www.juryblog.corn/the-role-of-thejudge (last visited Aug. 11, 2009) (commenting on trial judge's role in voir dire).
231. This statement holds especially true in long trials where there is a necessity to be able to
frankly address the jury about the dangers of misapplication inherent within the CSI Infection.
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real people." 232 The defendant argued on appeal "that reminding the
jury of their role sets up a television expectation that trivializes the
constitutional reasonable doubt standard. 2 3 3 The appellate court in
Mathis rejected the defendant's argument and found no error in the
2 34
prosecutor's opening statement.
The Mathis appellate ruling and the court's analysis appear to give
more leeway to litigants during opening statement; however, some
prosecutors have been less successful in their attempts to discuss CSI
Infection issues during closing arguments. 235 In Boatswain v. State,
during closing argument, the prosecutor stated:
The one issue left in this case is: Was it him? The defense would say,
well-and you know they will-there are no fingerprints of him.
They didn't print the money. They didn't find his prints on the note.
In today's day and age, unfortunately, the police and the State aren't
put in the same test that they wrote 200 years ago in the Constitution
in which they said the proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt.
Unfortunately, the test, of course, of criminal defendants now is, can
they meet the TV
expectation that they hope folks like you want. Can
23 6
they meet CSp

The Boatswain court found this argument improperly disparaged the
reasonable doubt standard.2 37 However, mentioning the CSI Effect in
closing argument is not completely off limits-other courts have
23 8
approved it.

Attempts by either litigant to alter the burden of proof to something
other than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard are always
239
prohibited.
C. A Good Defense is Always the Best Offense: The Age of Defensive
Prosecution
The presentation of evidence is another important battleground
during the trial. Aimed at thwarting the dangers of any potential CSI
232. Mathis v. State, No. 25, 2006, 2006 WL 2424741, at *4 (Del. Aug. 21, 2006).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See Boatswain v. State, No. 408, 2004, 2005 WL 1000565, at *3 (Del. Apr. 27, 2005).
236. Id. at*l.
237. Id. See Morgan v. State, 922 A.2d 395, 401-02 (Del. 2007) (finding the prosecutor's
rebuttal comment to be error, but not plain error).
238. See State v. Ash, No. A07-0761, 2008 WL 2965555, at *7-8 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 5,
2008) (finding prosecutor's rebuttal closing comments about CSI Effect was not prosecutorial
misconduct); Goff v. State, 14 So. 3d 625, 672 (Miss. 2009) (holding that the prosecutor's
reference to CSI in closing was not error).
239. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
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Infection within the jury, many prosecutors have expanded their expert
witness lists and requested permission to introduce a broader array of
explanatory evidence in their case-in-chief. 240 This type of prosecution
strategy is called defensive prosecution. 24 1 Jurors want to know why
certain types of tests were not done, and an explanation regarding the
absence of evidence is helpful to overcome any reasonable doubt the
jury may have and curb unrealistic expectations and misinformation
regarding forensic science and its capabilities. 24 2 Defensive prosecution
also attempts to blunt arguments raised by the defense regarding
24 3
insufficiency of the evidence.
Defensive prosecutions, however, do not proceed without objection
by the defendant. 24 4 As a counter-tactic to the prosecution's request to
admit evidence that explains the investigation and why certain scientific
evidence is absent, defendants have objected on evidentiary grounds
that the admission of negative or inconclusive scientific evidence is
either irrelevant, or alternatively, unfairly prejudicial.24 5 This type of
objection forces the court to consider the CSI Infection head-on because
the heightened juror expectation is part of the state's proffer regarding
the material relevance and necessity of the evidence for which it is
seeking admission.24 6 In State v. Cooke,24 7 the court ruled on the
impact of the CSI Effect issue on evidentiary grounds, holding:
240. MARICOPA COUNTY ATT'YS OFFICE, supra note 25; Thomas, supra note 39.
241. See State v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 355 (5th Cir. 2007) (reasoning that the government's
use of graphic photos of the murder victim were relevant, necessary, and not prejudicial,
especially considering heightened juror expectation and the CSI Effect); State v. Cooke, 914 A.2d
1078, 1088 (Del. 2007) (finding that in order to counter vulnerability to defense arguments of
insufficient investigative and scientific testing, "prosecutors now are almost required to engage in
... 'defensive prosecution"'). "In this age of the supposed 'CSI Effect,' explaining to the jury
why the Government had little in the way of physical or scientific evidence was arguably critical
to the Government's case." Fields,483 F.3d at 355 (footnote omitted).
242. Cooke, 914 A.2d at 1088. See also Goff, 14 So. 3d at 638-39 (describing that although
much blood evidence was collected, no DNA testing was conducted). In Goff, however, the
prosecution introduced into evidence an explanation as to why the test was not conducted. Id. at
639 n.13.
243. Cooke, 914 A.2d at 1087-88.
244. Id. at 1091-92 (objecting to the admission of negative and inconclusive scientific
evidence as irrelevant under FED. R. EVID. 401 or alternatively as unfairly prejudicial under FED.
R. EvID. 403).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1088.
[P]rosecutors are caught in a "Catch 22" conundrum. If they produce no record that
scientific tests were sought, they are subject to criticism and risk verdict reversal if
they, nevertheless, remark about the "CSI Effect." And then, if there were tests which
were inconclusive but again do not introduce evidence that the tests were even
conducted, the State's case is exposed to the argument that not enough was done.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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The State's "CSI Effect" argument has merit in two respects. First,
this Judge in a number of trials in the last several years or so has
witnessed defendants increasingly ... taking advantage of it by asking
witnesses about tests they know were not conducted and contending in
closing argument that the failure to test raises reasonable doubt. They
are taking appropriate advantage of a different kind of proof
expectations with which some jurors come into the courthouse in the
last several years as a result of these programs. It would be naive not
to recognize and acknowledge all of this. This does not mean the
Courtfinds that there is "CSI Effect" but, in fact, it means that there
is enough of a possibility of it that it cannot be ignored.2 4 8

Although courts have been reluctant to affirmatively rule on the
existence of the CSI Effect, they are mindful of its potential deleterious
impact if left unchecked, and have ruled on evidentiary challenges to
allow prosecutors to present this type of evidence. 249 For this reason,
courts have found negative scientific evidence to be relevant under the
evidentiary requirements for admissibility. 250 Prosecutors want to
explain the total story of the crime scene as well as its investigations,
including unsuccessful, unavailable, and inclusive test results. 25 1 It is
now common for prosecutors to call a latent fingerprint examiner to
testify, even in cases where no fingerprint evidence was found, 2to
52
explain to the jury why fingerprint evidence is absent from the case.
Ultimately, defendants must yield to the defensive prosecution strategy
who
because the evidentiary rules give deference to the prosecutor,
25 3
carries the burden to prove the case as he or she sees fit.
247. Id. at 1080-88 (surveying the available literature and finding merit in the state's
argument regarding the CSI Effect notwithstanding the absence of specific empirical studies
affirming its existence).
248. Id. at 1088 (emphasis added). See generally Mathis v. State, No. 25, 2006, 2006 WL
2434741 (Del. Aug. 21, 2006) (finding mention of CSI Effect comment in opening statement
allowable); Boatswain v. State, No. 408, 2004, 2005 WL 1000565 (Del. April 27, 2005) (ruling
mention of CSI Effect in closing argument to be improper).
249. See supra note 248 and accompanying text (citing cases supporting the proposition).
250. Cooke, 914 A.2d at 1088.
251. See id.
252. See id.
253. Notably, in a criminal trial the entire burden of proof is on the prosecution and the
defense is not required to prove anything. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 364 (1970). However, because the prosecution carries a high burden of proof, the court
correspondingly allows the state to introduce its evidence according to its preferences and theory
of the case without strategic interference or manipulation by the defense. Old Chief v. United
States, 519 U.S. 172, 186-87 (1997). The reason that a criminal defendant cannot typically avoid
the introduction of additional evidence of a particular element of the offense by stipulation is that
the government must be given the opportunity "to present to the jury a picture of the events relied
upon. To substitute for such a picture a naked admission might have the effect to rob the
evidence of much of its fair and legitimate weight." Id. at 187 (quoting Dunning v. Maine
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IV. THE CSI INFECTION IS DISTORTING THE MEANING OF THE EVIDENCE
Studies of juries have long indicated that lay jurors impose a higher
threshold of proof to convict. 254 The research of Kalven and Zeisel and
its subsequent replications indicate that there is an asymmetrical
disagreement between judges and juries with regard to their conviction
rates. Upon reviewing the same case "judges tend to convict when
juries would acquit more than juries tend to convict when judges would
acquit." 2 55 Thus, although jury expectations have historically been
higher than those of professional fact-finders, the CSI Infection goes
well beyond the application of a lower or higher burden of proof; it
delves into the realm of warping, skewing, and manipulating the
realities of evidence in a way that threatens the accuracy of the verdict
and the legitimacy of the criminal justice system.
Empirical studies of the CSI Effect are ongoing. The first studies
help to identify differences between jurors who watch CSl-type shows
and jurors who do not.25 6 While the results have mixed conclusions,
they do seem to indicate that jurors who watch large amounts of CSI, or
other, similar television shows, have higher expectations for scientific
forensic evidence. Further, CSI viewing jurors are increasingly hesitant
to believe the forensic science actually presented at trial. 257 In any
event, the consensus among practitioners is that CSI Infected Jurors
routinely appear in their criminal jury trials. 25 8 This Article can neither
confirm nor reject the accuracy of the fear of the CSI Infected Juror, yet
instead, it urges that the constitutional issues underlying the CSI Effect
Central R.R. Co., 39 A. 352 (1897)).
254. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 181 (Little, Brown &
Co. 1966) (explaining study of American jury system).
255. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: A Partial
Replication of the Kalven & Zeisle's The American Jury, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 171, 183
(2005) (confirming the existence of judge-jury disparity in more empirical studies); see also
Sherri M. Owens, The CSI Effect, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 27, 2005, at BI (illustrating a case
wherein the prosecutor and the jury disagreed regarding the overwhelming nature of the proof).
Michael Ofette, an assistant state attorney in Lake, Florida, presented a sexual assault case
without DNA evidence. Id. "The jury thought [the government] should have had DNA .
[Ofette, the prosecutor] thought the evidence was overwhelming." Id.
256. See, e.g., Podlas, supra note I (researching the empirical evidence of whether CSI Effect
impacts the criminal justice system); Shelton et al., supra note I (studying jurors to investigate
existence and extent of CSI Effect); Schweitzer & Saks, supra note 4 (testing the impact of CSI
Effect on jurors).
257. See Schweitzer & Saks, supra note 4, at 358 (discussing viewer expectations). The
Schweitzer and Saks study strengthens the argument that CSI-type shows cause CSI watchers to
have different juror expectations than non-CSl watchers have, yet it fails to establish a significant
correlation with ultimate verdict differences. Id. Shelton's study found a neutral impact, or no
difference, between the different types of jurors. Shelton et al., supra note 1.
258. Watkins, supra note 45.
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debate are significant enough to warrant further exploration of the
matter. The CSI Effect issue cannot be easily dismissed as non-existent
or a myth while more and more courts rule regarding it. Additionally,
of jurors after trial confirms the basis of
the anecdotal commentary
25 9
litigants' unease.
Multiple factors explain why jurors want more proof. The extreme
and recent popularity of fictional crime dramas and forensic crime
shows, designed to entertain, is merely one of several important
factors. 260 Other factors that may affect jurors' expectations include:
(1) the Innocence Project's 26 1 uncovering of many cases where juror
errors, forensic science errors, or eyewitness identification errors
resulted in unconscionable stories of innocent men spending decades in
jail for crimes they did not commit; (2) the materialization of DNA as a
new reliable forensic technology with the remarkable ability to
implicate or exonerate the criminally accused; (3) the emergence of the
technology era in which science and technology can do more, and do it
faster and more accurately than ever before; and (4) the fall from grace
of law enforcement due to numerous scandals 26 2 that exposed corrupt
practices such as planting evidence or lying under oath. These factors
may encourage citizens to become skeptical of police testimony and the
evidence or confessions obtained during
alleged incriminating physical
26 3
a criminal investigation.
As a general proposition, it is important that jurors rigidly hold the
government's case to its requisite high burden of proof beyond a

259. See MARICOPA COUNTY ATT'YS OFFICE, supra note 25; Watkins, supra note 45.
260. Shelton et al., supra note 1.
261. The following is an excerpt explaining the Innocence Project:
The Innocence Project is a non-profit legal clinic affiliated with the Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law at Yeshiva University and created by Barry C. Scheck and
Peter J. Neufeld in 1992. The project is a national litigation and public policy
organization dedicated to exonerating wrongfully convicted people through DNA
testing and reforming the criminal justice system to prevent future injustice.

The Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/about (last visited Sept. 25, 2009). Two
hundred and fifteen people have been exonerated since the inception of the Innocence Project. Id.
Cf. Margaret A. Berger, The Impact of DNA Exonerationson the CriminalJustice System, 34 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 320, 322 (2006) ("Despite the 172 exonerations, there is still unease in some
quarters about allowing challenges to the finality of convictions.").
262. ROGER KOPPL, CSI FOR REAL: How TO IMPROVE FORENSIC SCIENCE 7 (Dec. 2007),
Adam Liptak &
available at http://reason.org/files/d834fab5860d5cf4b3949fecf86d3328.pdf;
Ralph Blumenthal, New Doubt Cast on Crime Testing Case in Houston Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
5, 2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/05/us/new-doubt-cast-on-testing-inhouston-police-crime-lab.html; Adam Liptak, 2 States to Review Lab Work of Expert Who Erred
on ID, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2002, at A24.
263. Shelton et al., supra note 1.
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reasonable doubt. 264 It is appropriate and reasonable for modem
criminal jurors to expect better proof as investigatory technology and
forensic techniques improve; however, the danger that the CSI Infection
presents is not that jurors expect more forensic science, but rather that
fictional entertainment will lead to misinformation about criminal
investigations, prosecutions, and forensic science. The problem is not
merely a television show. The greatest threat is the inappropriate
application of fictional analysis in real life cases, which in some
instances has induced erroneous conclusions of fact and faulty verdicts.
The criminal justice system relies on lay people, ordinary citizens
untrained in the law, to consider the evidence presented to them in court
as neutral outsiders. 2 65 These lay jurors are asked to render conclusive
factual determinations. Some people argue a juror's status as a neutral
decision-maker may be compromised by the type of indoctrination that
may occur from excessive exposure to fictional sources on criminal
matters. 266 The crime novels, television shows, and films depicting
crimes, criminal investigations, and criminal prosecutions are altered
purposely for entertainment purposes, causing the line between reality
and fiction to be intentionally blurred by artists to make the film, novel,
or television show seem real, yet still entertaining. The artists'
motivation is not malicious; instead, it is mainly commercially driven.
Nonetheless, the knowledge learned from such sources may trick
viewers into believing they are trained to some degree to interpret the
26 7
law and science.
As the Shelton study suggests, CSI watchers have a higher
expectation for forensic science evidence. 26 8 That statistic alone may

264. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
265. See COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT, supra note 179, § 1.01.
1.01 THE FUNCTIONS OF THE COURT AND THE JURY: Members of the jury,
you have seen and heard all the evidence and the arguments of the attorneys. Now I
will instruct you on the law. You have two duties as a jury. Your first duty is to decide
the facts from the evidence in the case. This is your job, and yours alone. Your second
duty is to apply the law that I give you to the facts. You must follow these instructions,
even if you disagree with them. Each of the instructions is important, and you must
follow all of them. Perform these duties fairly and impartially. Do not allow
sympathy, prejudice, fear, or public opinion to influence you. [You should not be
influenced by any person's race, color, religion, national ancestry, or sex.] Nothing I
say now, and nothing I said or did during the trial, is meant to indicate any opinion on
my part about what the facts are or about what your verdict should be.
Id.
266. Tyler, supra note 1, at 1062-63.
267. Schweitzer & Saks, supra note 4, at 358.
268. Shelton et al., supra note 1.
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seem appropriate and non-prejudicial. However, the Schweitzer & Saks
study also found that CSI watchers are less likely to believe the forensic
science presented to them in court. 26 9 This statistic suggests that high
volume CSI watchers substitute their own research and expertise, gained
from watching entertainment television, for that of the legally
qualified 2 70 experts testifying in court. Notably, what the current
studies do not indicate is how heightened expectations influence the
actual verdicts, if at all. Some scholars that focus primarily on
271
conviction rates opine that no change has occurred in the age of CSI.
However, a review of the cultural landscape, the current case law, and
the commentary of participants in criminal litigation reveals that CSI
has caused some type of change in modern criminal jury trials. The
content of a jury's considerations are private and protected as secret
unless or until a juror volunteers to reveal it. 2 72 Therefore, it is quite
difficult to fully assess what most influences jurors during deliberations
Notwithstanding the
or even what facts they consider reliable.
limitation of jury privacy, it is important not to ignore 2 73 these
indications of change and risks of error.
While it is true as a matter of law that it is well within the purview of
the jury to decide the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the
witnesses, it is improper for jurors to base their determinations on
fiction. 27 4 Therefore, it is in the best interest of the larger society to
minimize the potential impact that the fictional justice system scripted
in Hollywood has upon the real American criminal justice system
demystified in actual courtrooms all across the country.

269. Schweitzer & Saks, supra note 4, at 358.
270. See FED. R. EvID. 702 (defining the standard for expert testimony); Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-48 (1999) (explaining the Daubert gatekeeping function);
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (setting forth factors to be considered
in determining whether to admit expert testimony).
271. Cole & Dioso-Villa, supra note 24, at 1356-64.
272. Morrison, supra note 44; Roane, supra note 44; Willing, supra note 42.
273. The court cannot bury its head in the proverbial sand, like an ostrich, and ignore the
situation. President Woodrow Wilson, Speech at Des Moines, Iowa (Feb. 1, 1916) ("America
cannot be an ostrich with its head in the sand.").
274. COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT,
supra note 179, § 1.04.
1.04 WEIGHING THE EVIDENCE-INFERENCES: You should use common sense in
weighing the evidence and consider the evidence in light of your own observations in
life. In our lives, we often look at one fact and conclude from it that another fact
A jury is allowed to make reasonable
exists. In law we call this "inference."
inferences. Any inferences you make must be reasonable and must be based on the
evidence in the case.
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V. CONCLUSION
The alleged existence of a CSI Effect has become a significant
adversarial issue within criminal jury trials in recent years-a new
aspect of modern criminal jury trials. The fear of CSI Infected Jurors
impacts the evidentiary, procedural, and constitutional issues in an
ordinary criminal trial. Procedural and substantive issues regarding the
2 75
CSI Effect have been raised in seemingly minor cases involving drug
or gun 276 possession as well as in the most serious death penalty
murder 27 7 convictions.
Although some scholars still debate the existence of the CSI Effect,
as well as the correct title for it, litigators and judges are dealing with
the CSI Effect. Rulings are based upon the CSI Effect, and the CSI
Effect, thus, operates in real cases on real juries. This Article seeks to
bridge the gap between the theoretical debate, the limited and early
empirical research, and the practical experience of litigators and trial
judges. The examination of recent appellate rulings that address various
phases of the criminal trial gives additional context to the ongoing
conversation. No matter what it is called, there is a real phenomenon
occurring in courtrooms all across the nation at both the state and
federal levels. The CSI Effect must be controlled to ensure fairness
within criminal jury trials.
Vigilance toward protecting the
constitutional fairness of the American criminal justice system can
never be too excessive-the stakes are too high and false outcomes are
too devastating.

275. See, e.g., United States v. Harrington, 204 F. App'x 784 (11th Cir. 2006) (affinring
conviction of defendant on various counts of drug trafficking); Evans v. State, 922 A.2d 620 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 2007) (affirming defendant's conviction of multiple drug-related offenses).
276. See, e.g., Brief for the Appellee, Johnson v. Maryland, 2009 WL 1865879 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. May 15, 2009) (No. 1687).
277. See, e.g., Goff v. State, 14 So. 3d 625 (Miss. 2009) (affirming defendant's conviction of
capital murder).
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